



ORIGINAL PAPER

UEFA Euro 2012 - the first big sporting project in Poland after communism

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Abstract:

Poland's first major sports event after the fall of communism was the organization, together with Ukraine, of the UEFA European Football Championships in 2012 (Euro 2012). This third most popular sporting event in the world, after the FIFA World Cup and the Summer Olympic Games, brought many image-related (prestigious) benefits to Poland, from which the Polish economy and society benefited. The organization of Euro 2012 created opportunities for strategic investments, that led to the acceleration of the country's civilizational development. The event, took place eight years after Poland joined the European Union, and constituted a significant impetus to develop a model of sports policy implemented by the Polish state. It also had long-term political consequences, especially in initiating Ukraine's European integration.

This article aims to outline organizing the event and analyze the consequences of Euro 2012 for Poland from a political science's perspective, using historical, decision-making, and institutional-legal methods.

Keywords: *sports policy, UEFA Euro 2012, Third Republic of Poland, Ukraine, football, history of sport.*

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Introduction

The previous practice of organizing major sports events – organized by international federations of sports associations on a global scale, held cyclically, attracting great public interest and global media attention (Woźniak, 2015: 61) – indicates the multidimensionality of their consequences.

The issue of choosing a host for an event usually has a political context and is often controversial. The most classic negative examples are the 1936 Summer Olympics in Berlin and the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, which promoted Nazism and Communism, respectively. The organization of the Winter Olympics in Sochi (2014) and the FIFA World Cup in Russia (2018) should already qualify as examples of contemporary Russian imperialism under the guise of so-called Putinism. On the other hand, the organization of the Summer Olympic Games in Rome (1960), Tokyo (1964), and Munich (1972), cities from the former Axis powers, which through the games showed their new democratic political quality as a counterbalance to the actions of Italy, Japan, and Germany from the first half of the 20th century, are positive examples (even despite the tragic terrorist attack in Munich).

The primary measure of obtaining, or even competing for, the organization of a major sports event is the economic potential, organizational capabilities, and – not insignificant given the constantly growing number of participants and fans – the geographical and demographic potential. All these criteria emphasize the political importance of the state. Therefore, the organization of the Games has ceased to be solely the domain of the national Olympic committee or national sports federations and has become primarily the responsibility of the state authorities (Jung, 2010: 166). As a result, governments vie to organize major sports events using various diplomatic means (sports diplomacy) (Kobierecki, 2018: 293-303). These events are usually associated not only with the highest level of national and international prestige, and therefore with image benefits for the host country (country branding), but also with real profits in the form of infrastructure development or revitalization, increased tourist traffic, or the inflow of foreign capital (Woźniak, 2015: 62-63). Moreover, this occurs despite the ever-increasing cost of hosting major sporting events in countries. We must remember the sports factor: traditions, successes, or the sportiness of the organizer's society, although the practice of recent years indicates that this factor is often neglected, and the final argument is money (e.g., Qatar, Saudi Arabia). A symptomatic example was the organization of the Summer Olympic Games in Seoul 1988 by South Korea, which brought the country long-term multidimensional success: significant support for democratization processes, acceleration of the process of opening up to the world, including communist countries, a flourishing of the innovative economy there; and, incidentally, activation of the relaxation process in East-West relations; and an excellent sporting result (Jung, 2010: 159-160, 166). These examples testify that professional sport, in particular, is a crucial component of the state's soft power, and Euro 2012 in Poland should be seen in this context.

Background

In the interwar period, sport became an object of Polish state interest. The rebirth of the state in 1918 intensified interest in sport among Poles, becoming an essential identity and integration factor after 123 years of German, Russian, and Austrian captivity. The enormous problems resulting from the devastation of World War

I and the need to unify a country divided between three states meant that it was only after Marshal Józef Piłsudski's so-called May Coup of 1926 that the Polish state took a more active role in organizing amateur and competitive sport. Subordinating it entirely to the army (the Ministry of Military Affairs), it became the leading creator of sport policy through the established chief authority for sport, the State Office of Physical Education and Military Training (Szujewski, 2018: 58). Its expression included the organization of international sporting events in Poland (Table 1). However, the young country's ambitions reached the organization of the Summer Olympic Games, which were announced during the June 1937 Warsaw 36th Session of the International Olympic Committee. The Games were planned for the Polish capital in the 1950s. (Szujewski, 2018: 76).

World War II in 1939 ended the Second Republic of Poland, nullifying Olympic plans. The communist government from 1944 (between 1952 and 1989 under the name People's Republic of Poland), which were subordinate to the Soviets, lacked such ambitions and opportunities. The interest in sport, both amateur and competitive, organisationally already based on Soviet models, did not diminish among Poles; nevertheless, the sports policy pursued during the communist state period was strongly ideologized (Pasko, 2012: 467). Thus, international sporting events at the masters level organized in Poland also promoted communism (Table 1). They took place despite the great devastation of war and the permanent economic and socio-political crisis.

After the fall of communism, sports in Poland, like all areas of life, experienced the organizational, financial, and infrastructure problems characteristic to the countries in political, social, and economic transition. Especially in the 1990s, Polish sport, particularly devastated during the last decade of communist rule (due to the imposition of martial law in 1981 and the boycott of the Summer Olympics 1984 in Los Angeles) - could not count on particular state interest. The sport was subordinated to the Council of Ministers, but only at the office level (since 1991. - Office of Physical Culture and Tourism; since 2000. - Office of Physical Culture and Sport) or department (since 2001, the Department of Physical Culture and Sport within the Ministry of National Education). This has led to an increasing decentralization of decision-making concerning sport. However, given the growing role of sport in the world at the beginning of the 21st century, the Polish political elite came to believe that sport should be made institutionally independent. The interim solution was the creation of the Ministry of National Education and Sport in 2002, and the final solution was the Ministry of Sport, established on 1 September 2005 (Gołdys, 2021: 19-22). This was linked to the Polish authorities deciding to apply to host Euro 2012.

Euro 2012 preparatory political process in Poland

The proposal to host the European football championships came from the president of the Football Federation of Ukraine (FFU), Hryhoriy Surkis, one of Ukraine's most important oligarchs with business and political ties to pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk. Surkis, who was then a member of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on behalf of Medvedchuk's party, the United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, hoped that the organization of the Euro 2012 would strengthen his position in both the political world in Ukraine and the sporting world - in Europe (Włoch, 2016: 75-76). The co-organisation of the Euro 2012 was initially proposed to the Russians. Still, the proposal was eventually accepted by the Polish Football Association (Polski Związek Piłki Nożnej, PZPN) - after a joint meeting of the boards of both federations in

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Lviv on 27 September 2003, at which the two unions signed a five-year cooperation agreement (Szczepek, 2016: 305-306).

The idea of organizing a major sporting event in a state that, after the collapse of communism, had some experience of sporting events - after 1990, Poland hosted several international tournaments in various sports (Table 1) - but not on such a large scale seemed absurd for economic reasons. The Polish public was generally sceptical and even derisive about the project, aware of the shortcomings of the stadium infrastructure and the road, rail, and hotel infrastructure. The Polish political world also had significant doubts. The unrealistic nature of the Polish-Ukrainian candidature meant that serious work on the project had yet to be inaugurated in Poland by the end of 2004. This can partly be explained by the fact that critical decisions were being taken at the time concerning Poland's accession to the European Union (Poland became a member on 1 May 2004). It was only when the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) sent the first application forms to be completed to the football federations of Poland and Ukraine at the turn of 2004 and 2005, together with the requirement that the government and some state and local government institutions provide political and economic guarantees, that the final political decisions had to be taken. This challenge was faced by the minority government of the post-communist party, the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD), headed by Prime Minister Marek Belka. Distrustful of the project, the politician nevertheless decided to go ahead with it, despite ambivalence from other political quarters (e.g., the Chief of the Civic Platform, Donald Tusk, had the most reservations) or even reluctance from ministerial officials. It is difficult to say which arguments prevailed, and among the key ones were both political issues - the need for a new dynamic in Polish-Ukrainian relations after the 'Orange Revolution' in Ukraine as support for the country's more comprehensive integration into European political and economic structures - and economic (modernization) issues for Poland (Włoch, 2016: 78-83). Not exactly anecdotal, but reflecting the 'spirit of the time' was Belka's later statement that the decisive argument for Finance Minister Mirosław Gronicki, who agreed to financial guarantees for UEFA, was that there was no real chance of hosting the tournament (Woźniak, 2015: 65).

After the Polish government adopted a resolution supporting the organization of Euro 2012 in Poland on 25 January 2005 and PZPN submitted its application to UEFA, it became apparent that the Polish-Ukrainian candidature would compete with Italy and Croatia-Hungary. The timing coincided with the appointment of a new government after the parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2005, formed by a conservative coalition of the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) and Self-Defence (Samoobrona RP). The new Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PiS) stepped up his efforts by appointing the Euro 2012 Advisory Council with the participation of representatives of eight ministries, the Polish Football Association, the Polish Olympic Committee, and the mayors of the six cities bidding to host the championships (Chorzow, Gdansk, Cracow, Poznan, Warsaw and Wroclaw) with a budget of around EUR 2,5 million. Its tasks included the development of Polish-Ukrainian bid documentation for the UEFA Executive Committee, the preparation of a plan for the presentation of the candidature to the UEFA Congress in March 2006, and the agenda for the final presentation, which took place at UEFA headquarters in Nyon, Switzerland, in April 2007. (Włoch, 2016: 83-85).

However, significant political obstacles emerged despite the preparatory work's progress. At the turn of 2006/2007, as a result of the suspension of the PZPN board and

the appointment of an external curator to the federation by the Minister of Sport due to a corruption scandal in Polish football, there was a threat that Poland would be suspended from UEFA and FIFA structures and that the Polish-Ukrainian candidature would be rejected, eventually, after mediation involving the President of the Republic of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, and FIFA President Joseph Blatter, the conflict resolved. Interestingly, a similar situation occurred a year later, when the Minister of Sport in the new liberal government formed in the autumn of 2007 by the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) and the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) reappointed a curator in the PZPN. At the time, this threatened to take away the tournament already awarded to Poland and Ukraine (Szczepłek, 2016: 307-308; Włoch, 2016: 87).

In the increasingly conflicted Polish political world, all political groupings formed a common front for action on the Euro 2012. Politicians, the event was seen as a potentially main political goal right after joining NATO and the European Union. It resulted in the provision of more than twenty UEFA-required government guarantees between 2005 and 2007, which included support from the public administration in the areas of, among other things, financing the construction or modernization of stadiums, providing security and safety and medical care; preparing accommodation centers for the football teams; organizing appropriate transport, developing air, road, rail and hotel infrastructure and communications in and between host cities; ensuring ticket distribution with UEFA requirements; and securing intellectual property rights (Włoch, 2016: 95).

Nevertheless, given the decision on the selection of the Euro 2012 organizer, which was to be made on 18 April 2007 at a meeting of the UEFA Executive Committee in Cardiff, Wales, both the political spheres and public opinion in Poland did not believe in the success of the Polish-Ukrainian candidature. What a surprise there was, also among the members of the Polish delegation headed by President Kaczynski, when UEFA President Michel Platini announced that the tournament organization had been awarded - not to Italy, widely regarded as the favorites - but to Poland and Ukraine. Despite many doubts following this verdict - raised mainly against Surkis and his alleged corrupt activities in the case - preparatory work for the Euro 2012 should have started as soon as possible (Szczepłek, 2016: 309).

A week after UEFA's surprising decision, Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński (PiS) appointed the Organising Committee for the organization of Euro 2012, and the Ministry of Sport and Tourism coordinated all government work. It prepared a special law on preparations for the tournament, adopted by the Polish parliament in September 2007, a detailed 'operational' document. It was a tool that significantly accelerated the decision-making process in the form of the possibility of establishing companies through which investments in the governmental area could be carried out more efficiently. It is worth mentioning that the investment plans were primarily correlated with the objectives of the disbursement of EU funds from the first significant perspective from 2007-2014 (Poland was guaranteed, among other things, EUR 7,3 billion under the Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment). Based on this law, special purpose departments were established in the first instance: PL.2012, responsible for coordinating most projects and liaising with UEFA; and the National Sports Centre for the construction of a new football facility in Warsaw (Włoch, 2016: 107-112).

The awarding of the right to host Euro 2012 to Poland and Ukraine also necessitated the conclusion of an international agreement between the two countries on

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framework cooperation and coordination of preparations for the tournament. Following an initiative by the presidents of Poland and Ukraine, Lech Kaczyński and Viktor Yushchenko, the agreement was signed on 28 March 2008 by the prime ministers of both countries, Donald Tusk and Yulia Tymoshenko. The main body responsible for coordinating cooperation was the Polish-Ukrainian Committee for the Preparation and Conduct of Euro 2012, headed by the prime ministers of both countries. Concretization of the collaboration, on the other hand, was to take place through executive agreements concluded between the respective governmental and local administrations of Poland and Ukraine (Malinowski, Tomanek, Pawlak, 2014: 47).

The impetus for preparatory work was halted with the early parliamentary elections held in October 2007. The new government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk (PO) slowed down the preparations, which involved disputes over competencies between PL.2012, a state-owned company working under the corporate system, and the government and local government administrations. The problems were compounded with the departure of the then Minister of Sport Mirosław Drzewiecki due to the so-called gambling scandal in autumn 2009. As a result, investments in the host cities, which were of crucial importance for Euro preparations - eventually, in an aura of internal Polish conflict, UEFA decided that the tournament would be held in four Polish cities (Gdansk, Poznan, Wroclaw, and Warsaw) and four Ukrainian ones (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kyiv, and Lviv) - were delayed. It was not until mid-2009 that work gathered pace after an agreement on close cooperation was signed between the four host cities, the Ministry of Sport, and PL.2012. On the other hand, a company set up by the PZPN, Euro 2012 Poland, was established on UEFA's initiative in May of that year, through which UEFA intended to supervise preparations for the 'sporting' part of the event, competence disputes with PL.2012 began, which lasted until the inauguration of the tournament (Włoch, 2016: 119-129).

It can be assumed that the 'institutional structure for the organization' of Euro 2012 in Poland was closed two years before the start of the event. The most crucial role in it was played by the governmental Euro 2012 Organising Committee, with the Prime Minister in charge. The Ministry of Sport fulfilled the operational role within which the Euro 2012 Office functioned. It supervised another operator, the PL.2012 company. The Minister of Sport also co-created, together with the mayors of the host cities, the Decision-making Committee for the strategy of activities at the governmental and local governmental level. In addition, there was the so-called G5 group, consisting of representatives of the Euro 2012 municipal offices and the management board of PL.2012. In May 2010, another essential entity was established - the Security Committee, the Medical Committee, and the Committee for the Protection of Rights, which comprised several dozen institutions. Four months before the event's start, most of its competencies and general coordination functions were taken over by the Committee for the Coordination of the Organisation of the Final Tournament of the UEFA Euro 2012. It was headed by the Minister of Sport and included the Ministers of Administration and Digitisation, Interior, Transport, Construction, and Maritime Economy; Health, as well as representatives of the Ministers of National Defence; Justice; Foreign Affairs, Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister; and the Governors of Lower Silesia, Lesser Poland, Mazovia, Pomerania and Greater Poland. It had the support of the National Operations Staff. A special parliamentary Sub-Committee played an essential role in Poland's preparations for the organization of the championships within the Committee on Physical Culture, Sport and Tourism, which

was an informative and consultative forum for all political groups in the Polish parliament, the Sejm (Włoch, 2016: 130-135).

Euro 2012 Effects for Poland

The organization of Euro 2012 in Poland was a complicated, heterogeneous process taking place in changing internal political conditions. It was determined by the possibilities and interests of the Polish state and local governments on the one hand and the requirements and expectations of UEFA on the other. In the political sphere, disputes between parties over preparations for Euro 2012 usually did not go beyond the ritual of the current political struggle. With changes in government configurations, organizational and institutional continuity was maintained. Conflicts and disputes were more evident at the level of the entities preparing the event, and they were primarily of a competence dimension. Given that more than 170 institutions were involved in the event's organization, they seemed inevitable.

Euro 2012 was supposed to confirm Poland's status in the international arena as a mature and trustworthy country that can handle this challenge and testify to the rightness of the chosen path of systemic transformation. At the same time, politicians pointed to an unprecedented opportunity for a leap in Poland's civilization and modernization, especially concerning transportation and sports infrastructure. During Poland's preparations for UEFA Euro 2012, 219 investments were planned. Eighty-three of these were considered crucial for the smooth organization of the tournament, with a total value of EUR 21 billion (Malinowski, Tomanek, Pawlak, 2014: 47). Of these, 69% of crucial investments were completed before the tournament began. The value of all investments carried out before Euro 2012 to the total planned extent during the 5-year preparation period amounted to almost EUR 12 billion, unprecedented in Poland's infrastructure development history. In terms of the structure of outlays related to the organization of the tournament, the vast majority of costs were for road transportation - 58% of total outlays, followed by rail transportation (13%), urban transportation (10%), stadiums (6%), hotels (6%), airports (5%) and sport-residential centers (2%) (Żuryński, 2014: 129).

In the short term, the balance of infrastructure investment associated with Euro 2012 could have been more clearly favorable. The cost of building stadiums in Poland - a total of more than EUR 1 billion - was high, and four of the tournament arenas did not prove profitable after Euro 2012. This was the case for the stadium in Poznan (capacity: 43,000; cost: EUR 160 million), Gdansk (capacity: 43,500; cost: EUR 205 million) and Wroclaw (capacity: 43,000; cost: EUR 215 million). The most expensive of these, the National Stadium in Warsaw (capacity: 57,000; cost: EUR 455 million), surprisingly proved to be the least loss-making (Żuryński, 2014: 139-141). During the tournament, 15 out of 31 matches were played in Polish stadiums and watched by 673,000 spectators, which were almost 99% full. This balance was excellent. Still, UEFA took over most of the ticket sales profits. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that during the championships, fans from abroad - from 127 countries (!) - accounted for 48% of the match audience. 3.2 million fans visited fan zones in the largest Polish cities. Another positive point is that as many as 12 out of 14 foreign national team staff chose the Polish sport-residential centers, created or modernized before Euro 2012, as the place of their stay during the tournament (Borowski, 2012: 6-13).

The new road infrastructure - 1,400 km of highways and express roads, among others- were built between 2007 and 2012. It directly contributed to increased travel

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comfort for visitors to Poland and the Poles themselves. The results significantly reduced travel time between Poland's largest agglomerations. However, not all investments could be completed before the championships (Malinowski, Tomanek, Pawlak, 2014: 53). In contrast, there was only a slight increase in the number of passengers traveling by rail after the tournament, despite the modernization of approximately 780 km of railway lines and 36 railway stations. Also, the number of air operations at Polish airports, after an increase during Euro 2012, remained at a similar level as before the tournament. Macroeconomic data indicated that between 2010 and 2013, Poland's economic growth averaged around 3% of GDP per year and was about 1% higher than the Eurozone average (Żuryński, 2014: 134-138, 144).

Thanks to Euro 2012, Poland's image abroad has improved significantly. According to the Social Research Centre, in a survey conducted among foreigners during the tournament, 85% of foreigners felt safe in Poland, 92% assessed our country's atmosphere as excellent, and 85% rated the organization of the championships in Poland highly. As a result, 92% of respondents were willing to recommend Poland to their friends as a country attractive for tourism and worth visiting, and 79% would like to visit again. Interestingly, Poles' evaluations were very similar; only the level of road infrastructure was assessed more critically. The generally positive assessment of the organization of Euro 2012 translated into Poland's progress in prestigious national brand rankings, such as the 'Country Brand Index' and the 'Future Brands Index' (Płonka, 2019: 42-46). The contribution of a usually foreigner-friendly society, including the work of 2,800 volunteers - 90% from Poland - was also crucial in this image's success (Borowski, 2012: 13).

In absolute numbers, Poland did not earn much from the organization of Euro 2012. The benefits were recorded primarily in tourism - according to the Polish Institute of Tourism, the expenditure of foreign tourists, numbering around 660,000 who visited Poland during Euro 2012, amounted to over EUR 230 million (Forbes, 2012). The event provided a significant boost in many areas in the long term. Euro 2012 helped to open up considerable investment in transport infrastructure, which continues to this day. This includes constructing roads and highways and modernizing railways and air transport. There has been an increase in investment in sports infrastructure, including the construction of many modern multi-purpose sports arenas and stadiums, which have seen a steady increase in attendance. This has multiplied the number of international sporting events Poland hosted after 2012 (Table 1). This results from Poland's continuous GDP growth (average annual GDP growth between 2004 and 2018 was 3.92%), also thanks to European funds.

After 2005, sports in Poland enjoyed institutional independence through a separate ministry. Professional sports are steadily rising thanks to financial support from large state-owned companies such as Orlen. It is at a good or excellent level in many sports, as evidenced by successes in the international arena (athletics, volleyball, handball, tennis, canoe, rowing, speedway, ski jumping, swimming, and cycling).

The co-organisation of Euro 2012 with Poland was also an essential impetus for Ukraine's European choice. The opportunity to participate in a significant event with many foreign guests in a sporting festive atmosphere indicated their European ambitions, especially for young Ukrainians. One can risk the claim that the co-organisation of Euro 2012 together with Poland contributed to the firm opposition of the majority of Ukrainian society to the decision of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in late 2013 to postpone the signing of the Association Agreement with the European

Union. It manifested itself in the so-called Revolution of Dignity of 2013/2014, which defined Ukraine's anti-Russian and, at the same time, European aspirations. The result was a rapprochement with Poland.

Summary

The organization of the European Football Championship in 2012 in Poland should be assessed as decidedly positive. The economic, social, and image effects (Table 2), the so-called Euro effect, proved to be essential for the country's sustainable development in the long term. Euro 2012 gave another vital pro-development impulse in Poland's significant modernization project after the communist-era stagnation. It also turned out to be a success for the entire political class, which proved that, despite substantial differences in worldview, it is possible to cooperate on implementing major projects - even with the reservation that the need for cooperation was also due to pressure from UEFA. What could have been a success, however, was the participation of Polish footballers in the tournament, who lost their rivalry in the weakest group of the championship (against Czechia, Greece, and Russia), failing to advance to the tournament's knockout stage...

Table 1. Organization of international sports events of masters level in Poland in popular sports (1918-2023)

Own preparation based on: 100 lat polskiego sportu. Kronika (2021); Michalik, M.B. (1993); Szujewski, K. (2018).

	Second Republic of Poland (1918-1939)	People's Republic of Poland (1952-1989)	Third Republic of Poland (1990-2023)
Archery	WC: Lwów 1931; Warszawa 1932		WC: Kraków 1991 EC: Legnica 2018
Athletics		EC: (I) Katowice 1975	WC: (I) Gdańsk/Sopot 2014 EC: (I) Toruń 2021
Basketball		EC: (M) Wrocław 1963; (W) Łódź 1958; Poznań 1978	EC: (W) 1999 ¹ ; 2011 ² ; (M) 2009 ³
Boxing		EC: Warszawa 1953; Katowice 1975	
Canoe		EC: Poznań 1961	WC: Poznań 1990; 2001; 2010; 2012 EC: Poznań 2000; 2004; 2005; 2021
Cycling			WC: (T) Pruszków 2009; 2019 EC: (T) Pruszków 2010
Fencing	WC: Warszawa 1934	WC: Gdańsk 1963	EC: Kraków 1994; Gdańsk 1997; Toruń 2016
Figure Skating			EC: Warszawa 2007
Football			EC: (M) 2012 ⁴

1 Katowice, Poznań, Pruszków.

2 Bydgoszcz, Katowice, Łódź.

3 Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk, Katowice, Łódź, Poznań, Warszawa, Wrocław.

4 with Ukraine; Gdańsk, Poznań, Warszawa, Wrocław.

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Gymnastics		EC: (W) Kraków 1959; (M) Warszawa 1969	EC: Szczecin 2019
Handball			WC: (M) 2023 ⁵ EC: (M) 2016 ⁶
Ice Hockey	WC/EC: Krynica 1931	WC (A): Katowice 1976	
Judo			EC: Gdańsk 1994; Wrocław 2000; Warszawa 2017
Luge	EC: Krynica 1935	WC: Krynica 1958; 1962	
Rowing	EC: Bydgoszcz 1929	EC: Poznań 1958	WC: Poznań 2009 EC: Poznań 2007; 2015; 2020
Sailing		WC: (F) Gdynia 1965	WC: (F) Gdańsk 1997
Shooting	WC: Lwów 1931		
Ski	WC: Zakopane 1929; 1939	WC: Zakopane 1962	
Speed Skating			WC: Warszawa 1997
Swimming			EC: (S) Szczecin 2011
Table Tennis			EC: Gdańsk/Sopot 2011 ⁷ ; Warszawa 2021
Wrestling		WC: (c) Katowice 1974; 1982 EC: Katowice 1972; (f) Łódź 1981	WC: (c) Wrocław 1997; (f) Poznań 1998 EC: Poznań 1990; (f) Warszawa 1997; 2021
Volleyball			WC: (W) 2022 ⁸ (M) 2014 ⁹ ; 2022 ¹⁰ EC: (W) 2009 ¹¹ ; 2019 ¹² (M) 2013 ¹³ ; 2017 ¹⁴ ; 2021 ¹⁵

Legend:

A - group A
c - classic style
EC - European Championships
F - Finn class
f - freestyle
I - indoor
M – men’s
S - short course
T - track cycling
W – women’s
WC - World Championships

5 with Sweden; Gdańsk/Sopot, Katowice, Kraków, Płock.

6 Gdańsk/Sopot, Katowice, Kraków, Wrocław.

7 with Turkey.

8 with the Netherlands; Gdańsk/Sopot, Gliwice, Łódź.

9 Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk/Sopot, Katowice, Kraków, Łódź, Warszawa, Wrocław.

10 with Slovenia; Gliwice, Katowice.

11 Bydgoszcz, Katowice, Łódź, Wrocław.

12 with Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey; Łódź.

13 with Denmark; Gdańsk/Sopot, Gdynia.

14 Gdańsk/Sopot, Katowice, Kraków, Szczecin, Warszawa.

15 with Estonia, Finland and Slovakia; Gdańsk/Sopot, Katowice, Kraków.

Table 2. Poland's economic effects of Euro 2012

Source: Żuryński, R. (2014). Ekonomiczno – organizacyjne efekty UEFA Euro 2012. *Ekonomia XXI Wieku*, (3), 143.

Pre-event effects	Effects during the event	Post-event effects
new road rail, air infrastructure	inflow of foreign tourists	increased tourism traffic
new sports arenas	growth in internal consumption	greater accessibility of regions - influx of investors
new accommodation	increased tourist spending	increased number of events at new arenas
growth in internal consumption	widespread optimism and pride	increase in travel comfort
growth in employment	Poland's promotion in the international arena	increased Poland's visibility
modernised tourism infrastructure	strengthening social ties (through social action, volunteering)	greater profit from tourism
general economic growth (mainly due to the construction sector)	traffic difficulties	difficulty in maintaining sports infrastructure

positive

negative

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