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Western Politicians in the Polish Post-War Public Discourse

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Abstract:

The aim of the article is to analyse public discourse in post-war Poland, where the images of Western politicians and their approach to Eastern countries were studied. The research assumed the hypothesis that the positive image of social democratic leaders in the Polish discourse resulted from the legitimacy needs of the authorities. The politicians Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky themselves played a decisive role in shaping a positive image, appreciated all over the world for the effective implementation of *Ostpolitik*. The qualitative method was adopted, particularly critical discourse analysis (CDA). The hypothesis concerns the relationship between the propagated images of a Western politician and the legitimacy of the communist authority. Among the images of leaders most often depicted over several decades and relating to his biographical threads, what is dominant in the Polish media coverage is that of a politician with socialist and anti-communist views. Among the most frequently presented pictures of Western politicians in the Polish public sphere, five of the most important ones are that of a socialist, an anti-communist, a partner, a statesman and an architect of *Ostpolitik*. Western state seeking trade contacts in the East, defining the principles of political cooperation, describing the economic conditions of countries with different systems and designating and consolidating the elements that positively characterise bilateral relations, especially those related to a common tradition and culture.

Keywords: *Wily Brandt; Germany; Bruno Kreisky; Austria; public discourse; newspapers; communist regime; bilateral relations; Ostpolitik.*

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Introduction

Among the many elaborate definitions of discourse analysis, the classifications presented by Ruth Wodak were adopted. 'Discourse analysis provides a general conceptual framework for problem-oriented social research' (Wodak, 2015:3). It allows for the combination of various dimensions of interdisciplinarity and many viewpoints on the research subject. Discourse analysis is considered 'a social activity where specific patterns, common features, relations concerning various texts and the conditions in which they arise [are] looked at' (Wodak, Krzyżanowski, 2011:12). According to the definition (Lemke, 1995:5), discourse analysis assumes the existence of certain patterns and common features within knowledge and structures while the text is a concrete and unique discourse is realised. The analysis of the printed texts present in the Polish discourse in the post-war period began with determining the pool of source materials that was available during such period. The method of building the research corpus was adopted from Gerlinde Mautner (Mautner, 2011:56-61). The method of building a corpus depends to a large extent on the examined problem and the adopted hypotheses. The adopted study hypothesis concerns the relationship between the propagated images of a Western politicians and the legitimacy of the communist authority in Poland. Among the images of social-democrats most often depicted over several decades and relating to their biographical threads, what is dominant in the Polish media coverage is their will to cooperate with the East.

The textual sources in the analysis included transitivity, modality, source identification, and argumentative tools to establish the author-reader relationship. According to O'Halloran and Coffin, it "[positions] the reader to adopt a certain point of view" (O'Halloran, Coffin 2004: 277). Moreover, Reinhart Koselleck believes that most assessments are related to personal preferences and not to the knowledge of the context in which texts are created (Koselleck, 2014: 334). One should also be mindful of the variety of languages spoken by different groups, communities and even classes. In the course of research on the history and evaluation of post-war bilateral relations, questions about the leading concepts that make up the narrative are repeatedly asked, and new answers are obtained (Duszak, 2014: 227).

A group of authors who regularly published texts related to Western politicians after the war to include them in public did it for a specific purpose. In the analysis below, the topic of disseminating knowledge about Austria and Germany was critical. What was used to implement the adopted plans can be divided into two groups. The first one concerns publishing and assume actions that mark clear turning points, anniversaries, breakthrough points related to doctrines or visits of state dignitaries. The second one focused on the result itself, the result. What assumed that the results of the activities would have an element of evaluation and feedback both in Poland and abroad.

Bruno Kreisky

The section on assessments and images of the Austrian Chancellor - Bruno Kreisky, was prepared on the basis of many years of research on diplomacy, bilateral relations and the reception of this figure in public media (Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, 2018). The research questions that were formulated in the course of these studies were posed to the Polish reception of a similar Western politician - Social Democrat Chancellor Willy Brandt. (Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, 2021). For post-war Austria, openness to all neighbours brought tangible benefits and was an important element of the country's identity, giving citizens a sense of satisfaction and fulfilment. Meanwhile,

the priorities in relations with Austria established in Poland in the 1960s and developed in the following decades did not result from a proper assessment of the intentions of Austrian politicians. The diplomacy of the minister and then chancellor Bruno Kreisky was not perceived in Poland as a coherent and consistent political principle implemented since 1959 with eastern countries. In the early days of bilateral relations, there were no clear and positive images of Western leaders. It did not precisely define the political goals adopted by the West. Hence, the assessments of their anti-communist activity were often cautiously repeated.

As a leader and the partner Bruno Kreisky, in a sense, started *Ostpolitik* in relations with eastern countries, which was carried out in the following years by the German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Throughout the development of the neighbourhood policy, he consistently avoided calling the neighbourhood policy an eastern policy. Kreisky believed that the *Ostpolitik* concept was identical to German diplomacy and distanced himself from it strongly. He also believed that the term *Ostpolitik* emphasized the eastern, inferior nature of the region, which was in line with how German historiography related to the history of Central Europe. On the other hand, the concept of the neighbourhood policy was to emphasize common points in the past, the politics and culture of the countries associated with Vienna and constitute its partner character. Although Kreisky had been friends with Willy Brandt since his emigration to Sweden and appreciated his achievements in foreign policy, it was more important to emphasize the role of active international politics in Austria (Lechański: 1997: 51).

The development of the image of a partner and statesman presented in Polish messages was also associated with the period of prosperity. An important stage in bilateral relations in the years 1970-1980 was characterized by the best economic indicators in the post-war period. At that time, the Austrian Chancellor was seen as a leader of small and disengaged states, had a strong position among European Social Democrats, pursued an independent Middle East policy and created Vienna as a centre for international meetings. He was not the only partner cooperating with Warsaw, but he was one of the most important. It was not just about the exchange rates or the amounts granted to Poland under the credit lines. Austria supported Polish affairs on the international forum, and Kreisky was repeatedly cited as a spokesman for eastern states. In the second half of the 1970s, Poland's position compared to other communist countries was clearly weakening. The undertaken reforms ended in complete failure, hence a number of actions on the part of Austria to prevent the economic catastrophe of the eastern country (Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, 2018: 208).

As social discontent in Poland grew in 1980-1981, the chancellor was aware of possible Soviet intervention and estimated the costs of securing Austrian interests. Until December 17, 1981, he officially defended the position of the state authorities and believed that the striking workers and the Catholic Church were to blame for the prevailing crisis. However, he consistently rejected invitations to visit Poland when the authorities in Warsaw were trying to break the political isolation following the introduction of martial law. Even then, he continued to offer economic aid to counter the crisis, openly supported the Poles and was positive about the reform attempts (Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska, 2018: 209). Polish decision makers have repeatedly used the images and statements of Kreisky to legitimise unpopular decisions, such as the reforms preceding the imposition of martial law in the country

Various assessments of the perception of political activity and Chancellor Kreisky himself focus on the following conclusions. Kreisky's favourable attitude

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towards Poland resulted from his internal conviction about the need for cooperation with the East and not from the conditions created by the Polish side. For this reason, it was easy to describe him as a partner and trustworthy statesman. The diplomacy of the minister, and later Chancellor Kreisky towards Poland, focused on building independence from the EEC, the conviction that the eastern countries bordering Austria with their economic and political systems could be a counterbalance to the development of Western Europe and an alternative to Austrian political policy. This was explained by the politician's socialist views and the emigration past. Eastern countries, including Poland, could build a new Austrian identity by promoting cultural heritage and referring to common Central European values. This strengthened the image of a partner and leader. It was also emphasized that, in line with the chancellor's views, the constant development of the eastern neighbours served the development of Austria.

Willy Brandt

The analysis covers press and journalistic publications published after 1956, the vast majority of them published after 1970, after the normalization treaty between the Polish People's Republic and Germany was signed. The figure of Willy Brandt was present in journalism throughout the entire period of the Polish People's Republic. The culminating point was the period of preparation, signing and ratification of standardization agreements with socialist countries. The ruling SPD-FDP coalition broke with the implementation of the policy based on the "Hallstein doctrine" and recognized the line on the Odra and Nysa Łużycka as the western border of Poland (Kisztełińska-Węgrzyńska, 2009: 29-53). A critical analysis of the text made it possible to distinguish a few of the most important images of a politician formed in the years 1956-1989: socialist, statesman, architect of eastern policy, partner (Kisztełińska-Węgrzyńska, 2018: 317-368).

Willy Brandt will appear quite early in the pages of Polish journalism of the post-war period. The Polish reader gets to know him as a correspondent of the Norwegian daily "Arbeiderbladet" from Oslo at the Nuremberg trials (Lorenz, 2012). Marian Podkowiński, one of the main journalists assessed in the German period under investigation, describes the German rules in the 1954 edition of a report dedicated to impressions from Nuremberg boxes. Podkowiński mentioned that he appeared during the trial during which Brandt was to defend the Waffen-SS. Polish Columnist explains that Brandt was in exile and served British intelligence during his presence there. Brandt was described as a part of *Schumachers's company* in Berlin. The later policy of Brandt served as a typical example of hypocrisy in Social Democratic Party of German. The SPD Eastern Office, in which Brandt held high positions, was for Polish propaganda nothing more than „*a diversionary organisation directed against the GDR*” (Podkowiński, 1954: 61-62). The makers of this politician's image corresponded to the image characteristic of the entire group of West German Social Democracy Party at that time and fit in with the black and white narrative of Germany (Patecka-Frauenfelder, 2013: 457-471), which distinguished between the "peace-loving" German Democratic Republic and "the continuing worst German tradition of West Germany" (Dmitrów, 1987), (Sakson, 1993), (Kiwerska, 1993), (Tomala, 2000).

In the period after 1956, the monotonous image of the German political scene was enriched with new threads. It corresponded to the tactical correction of the course in the USSR's policy towards the SPD, adopted at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in place of 1956 (Lemke, 2021:55). In his speech, the Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, who could agree with other socialist forces, postulated the possibility of mutual exchange of

accusations and mutual points, by way of synchronization and principles of cooperation with the western part of social democracy (Chruszczow, 1965: 3). In the pages of the widely read weekly *Polityka*, its leading publicist, and then editor Mieczysław F. Rakowski wrote that "*false, sectarian ideas about social democrats*" had been abandoned, he called for balanced, reflecting opinions that could be known to them "*as what they are*" (Rakowski, 1958a: 8). Although the decisions made at the congress in Bad Godesberg in 1959, in which the SPD was considered to be supra-class (Wojna, 1971:168), the relative concentration would destroy the common lineage with the communists (Górnicki, 1971: 154), to public journalism (Rakowski, 1958b: 137), (Podkowiński, 1960: 88-89). There was hope that the SPD, as a mass group, played a role in the fight for a peaceful Germany and a relaxation of the normal situation. A special role in this process was assigned to Willy Brandt after 1970. It was discussed whether it would be able to break "*forever this umbilical cord of Prussian, militarism and chauvinism, as strong as a steel wire.*" Journalists praised Brandt as a great figure with an awareness of the consequences of modern history and a view of the past. (Górnicki, 1971: 154-155).

Socialist

When writing about the shaping of Willy Brandt's figure, particular attention was paid to the conditions in which his socialist worldview was developed. The decisive factors in this regard were attributed to his proletarian origin and upbringing, and to his adolescence (Podkowiński, 1972). Willy Brandt, or rather Karl Herbert Frahm, was born in 1913 in the working-class district of Lübeck as the illegitimate child of a saleswoman, (Wojna, 1971: 167). He has experienced poverty and humiliation for most of his life (Górnicki, 1971: 149-150). He was raised by his grandfather "well-read in the sections of Marx, Engels, Lasallli and Bebel". Brandt was admitted to the SPD at the age of sixteen, and two years later he joined the faction that broke away from the SPD and formed a left-wing party, the Socialist Workers' Party. According to Rakowski, this step was "an expression of protest against the rotten compromise of the SPD leaders" (Rakowski, 1971: 105). Another fact that Brandt did not succumb to Hitler's phraseology was his undertaking underground activities. Threatened with arrest by the Gestapo, he emigrated to Norway (Podkowiński, 1971: 2). There, he joined the Norwegian Labor Party, engaged in cooperation with young social democrats in Oslo, and served as a liaison for individual German anti-fascist groups operating in Western countries (Podkowiński, 1971: 2), (Rakowski, 1971: 105). He took an active part in émigré discussions, outlining a vision of a democratic, peaceful and socialist Germany. During the Spanish Civil War, he worked as a war correspondent (1937-1939). After the outbreak of World War II and the Nazi aggression against Norway, he took part in the battles of the Norwegian auxiliary corps, for which he obtained Norwegian citizenship. Then, after the fall of this country, he emigrated to Sweden, where he continued the anti-Nazi struggle (Podkowiński, 1971: 2). He returned to his native country in the uniform of a Norwegian press officer, he was a Norwegian press rapporteur at the Nuremberg trial, and later the press chief of the Norwegian military mission in occupied Berlin (Podkowiński, 1971: 2). In Berlin, he joined the work of the Social Democrats operating there.

Disagreements with Kurt Schumacher, the party's chairman, resulted from different visions of Germany, and the head of the SPD tried to make the party as national as possible. Brandt, on the other hand, emphasized the European element in the development of Germany and argued for the unity of the West. In 1958 he became

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mayor of West Berlin, then a member of the leadership and party chairman (Rakowski, 1971: 107-108). He lost the elections in 1961 and 1965, during which he was slandered and "spit on". He was reminded of his origin (son of an unmarried mother, "a man without his own surname) and anti-fascism (he appeared on earth in an Allied uniform) (Drecki, 1973: 87). Such attacks were translated in Polish journalism as a sign of remorse and hostility. Brandt was to be, in the opinion of many of his countrymen, the incarnation of sins against "German holiness" (Drecki, 1973: 87). Polish journalism referred to the earlier, negative assessment of Brandt's political activity in the Berlin section. It was explained that his activity was at that time in conflict with the policy of the socialist countries. Brandt's process of "conversion" was pointed out. "Insincere buddy Willy", trying to please everyone, turned into a statesman - the best minister in the history of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Drecki, 1973: 88-89). Brandt's sentence when the election results were announced that "only now did Hitler finally lose the war!" (Wojna, 1971: 173). The coalition with the CDU/CSU was approached critically, although with a full dose of optimism. In the commentary on the activities of the Great Coalition, i.e. "the company of the ex-Nazi Kiesinger with the ex-anti-fascist Brandt", the words Günter Grass addressed to Brandt were quoted that you cannot "combine water with fire, even if some sorcerer attempted to do so" (Podkowiński, 1967: 277-278). The Grand Coalition does exist, but its two main pillars - Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Willy Brandt do not fit together (Rakowski, 1971:108). Only the next elections elevated Brandt to the chancellor's chair and enabled him to make an independent policy (Wojna, 1971: 173). This election met with a spontaneous reaction from voters who "without invitations, spontaneously" came to his villa located above the city with congratulations. The first to arrive were old party comrades, including many workers, then a group of young people with torches (Wojna, 1971: 167).

Brandt's great charismatic potential was noticed earlier. In a report published in 1967, Podkowiński wrote that the SPD realized that without Brandt there would be no won elections (Podkowiński, 1967: 275). According to the publicist, "Willy" had an undisputed position - he was the undisputed leader of the party, indeed!, its "father and roof" (Drecki, 1973: 12-13). In the face of his resignation from the chancellor's office in 1974, he achieved a record achievement by uniting allied parties despite numerous divergences within the parties (Podkowiński, 1974a: 9). Thanks to his intercession, the left wing, trade unions and Young Socialists (Jusos) expressed their full confidence in the new chancellor Helmut Schmidt (Podkowiński, 1974b:8-9) Brandt's too much leniency towards the latter has become one of the reasons for misunderstandings within the party (PAP, 1974b: 12), (Rakowski 1974: 32-33). In this context, the press showed the loneliness of the chancellor, who wanted to remain firmly in the middle (Bartosz, 1974: 5). Ultimately, he did not support the young socialists who "wanted to nationalize all natural resources, industry, and cut themselves off from" the free market economy", stating unequivocally that their program is not compatible with the Godesberg program (PAP, 1974a: 2). Brandt's adherence to the capitalist world, despite his declared socialist worldview, did not come as a surprise to Polish journalists, who were distinguished mainly by Western politics.

Statesman

For the press of the Polish People's Republic, he was the most popular statesman in Europe "ever has been born by the Bonn political scene" (Lesiewski, 1974: 2). Counted next to General de Gaulle among the realistic politicians of the West, he served as confirmation that also in the capitalist countries there existed and strengthened

realistic and sober forces, inclined to enter into dialogue. It was emphasized that both politicians had long opposed the policy of imperialism in its extreme form (Świerkowski, 1974: 22-23). It was emphasized that he belonged to the western, capitalist world and the decision related to such a declaration, i.e. a determined policy to strengthen the bonds of the German Federal Republic with the West, Germany's participation in NATO, and support for the concept of economic and political unification of Western Europe (Rakowski, 1971: 110). Despite opting for "on the anti-communist side of the barricade," he was a realist, he had the instincts characteristic of politicians of great standing. Despite many failures, he saw opportunities earlier than others and took the risk of implementing them (Wojna, 1971: 167).

To confirm the opinion that his attitude was admired all over the world, Polish journalism referred to opinions taken from foreign magazines, in which Brandt was presented as a politician of great format, and his actions as pan-European initiatives. The American Time magazine in 1970 called him "the man of the year". While emphasizing the importance of his policy of cooperation with the East, it was stated that, especially in many American and Swedish commentaries, an equal sign was placed between the fate of the head of the present West German government and the fate of European politics. For example, France Soir in Paris was to warn that Brandt's defeat would be a disaster for all of Europe. And in the opinion of The New York Times - the collapse of the Brandt government was almost always identified with the rejection of the Eastern treaties, and this, according to the American weekly, would trigger "an immediate crisis in relations between the East and the West and possibly even the resumption of the Cold War" (Dylewski, 1975: 66).

Brandt's merits for West Germany and Europe consisted in the fact that he was the first West German politician in power to reconcile the interests of his state with the interests of the peaceful development of Europe, and he was also the first politician to pursue foreign activity in his country in all directions, i.e. also towards socialist Europe. The publicists showed him as a brave, steadfast person in combat (Lesiewski, 1975: 2). Putting German policy on a new course was a decision that required courage, character and perseverance (Podkowiński, 1971: 2). His choices had far-reaching consequences, and he was constantly exposed to constant attacks by the right. In one of the Polish weeks, the opinion was expressed that political opponents were not able to overthrow Brandt through the normal parliamentary procedure provided for by the constitution of the German Federal Republic, therefore they used the Guillaume espionage scandal for this purpose, which - as it was claimed, citing reports from Germany and the world, that the scandal was not a sufficient explanation of the reasons for the Willy Brandt's resignation from the office of chancellor and served the Polish press as proof that "there are cases and accusations that cannot be dealt with even for a statesman of this class". His popularity meant that with the passage of time he became more and more a moral instance than a politician. He saw the problems globally, not only in a particular (Nowakowski, 1985b: 2).

Eastern policy architect

Brandt's image was created primarily on the basis of his efforts to sign and ratify the Eastern Agreements. The narrative conducted about him was intended to explain why in the entire "East" the assumption of the chancellor's office by the Social Democrat was greeted with approval and with a certain amount of surprise (Górnicki, 1971: 154). Journalists argued that its anti-fascist past had played a special role in mediating between the East and the West, and in winning the sympathy and trust of the

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Eastern Bloc (for example, a situation in which a representative of the Polish People's Republic government could sit at the same table with Kiesinger was not imagined) (Rakowski, 1971: 108), (Górnicki, 1971: 154). However, in addition to the favorable biography, a decisive role was played by the declarations made during the election campaign, which could be considered an alternative to the program preached and implemented by previous governments. Admittedly, it was emphasized that the new government continued to serve the interests of imperialist West Germany, and Brandt pursued a policy of the same forces and classes. It was admitted, however, that "Brandt and his team gave up many phrases unfriendly to the socialist countries and abandoned many anti-communist moves of the former Bonn governments" (Rakowski, 1971: 110). The most important ones included the formulation about two German states, the departure from the Hallstein doctrine, the signing of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties of 1970 (Guz, 1971: 60), and the development of a "regulated coexistence" between the GDR and the FRG, (Stefanowicz, 1969: 2).

The source of eastern policy was noticed in Władysław Gomułka's declaration of May 17, 1969, in which the First Secretary proposed that Germany sign an agreement similar to the agreement with the German Democratic Republic of July 1950 (the Zgorzelec Agreement) (Jarząbek, 2011), (Stokłosa, 2011). As explained after Gomułka, "in Europe there is no problem of borders, but the problem of peace". The regulation of such fundamental issues for the Polish nation as the border issue was intended to reduce the tensions caused by Germany's revisionist policy.

It was argued that Brandt's initiation of the Polish initiative was not due to his love for Poland. Brandt, as a German, was to be guided by the *raison d'état* of the bourgeois German state, the same as his antagonists Kiesinger, Strauss and other Christian Democrat leaders (NRF, 1970: 7). Continuing this narrative, it was made clear that Eastern policy was a success of the foreign policy of the socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union. The result of working out such a balance of forces that led to the conclusion of agreements favorable to socialist states, and only on the basis of this alliance does it have a chance of survival (Bartosz, 1977).

Brandt's merit consisted in noticing this opportunity, accepting the reality, new borders, including the existence of a second German state, the German Democratic Republic, convincing his country to the solutions developed by the SPD-FDP coalition and protecting them against the opposition (Lesiewski, 1974: 2). The "Strauss offensive" and attacks by the Springer press linked to the right were particularly intense (Górnicki, 1971: 165). Brandt was accused of selling off national interests (Rakowski, 1971: 41), opening the way of Bolshevism to Europe. Even Brandt's favorable stance towards the idea of calling a European security conference was, in the eyes of his greatest opponent, Franz Josef Strauss (CSU), "adventurous", a symptom of long-standing "socialist delusions" (Rakowski, 1971: 88). Brandt's first tangible successes were the signing of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties of 1970. Brandt's often repeated (especially in the Polish context) statement was made in a television message broadcast from Moscow that "with this treaty only what has long been lost is lost. We have the courage to open a new page in history. It should be for the benefit of the young generation, which grew up in conditions of peace and does not bear joint responsibility for the past, and yet bears the consequences of the war, because no one can escape the history of their own nation" (Lesiewski, 1970a: 1). Another breakthrough was the agreement of 1970, which - as it was emphasized - will remain in memory next to the signing of the Zgorzelec Agreement "as the fact that the entire German nation recognizes what had already been

sealed by history (Kot, 1970: 8-9). Thanks to realistic politics, Brandt led Germany out of the alley and opened a wide path to world politics (Lesiewski, 1970b: 3).

Partner

Agreements with Poland and Moscow became the basis for normalization between the Federal Republic of Germany and the socialist states. In subsequent editions of Brandt's image, in particular in the years 1977, 1981 and 1985, 1988, the former chancellor appears as a guarantor of their decisions and an unquestionable authority on international issues. On the occasion of his visit in 1977, the deputy chairman of the SPD board and the mayor of Bremen, Hans Koschnick, was quoted as saying that Brandt's visit to Poland had the status of Polish-West German relations, both in the bilateral and European aspect (Koschnick, 1977: 1-2). Brandt was to warn against "succumbing to illusions that what had already been achieved in bilateral relations would be guaranteed a permanent life on the basis of mechanical continuation" (PAP, 1977). Polish journalism, presenting Brandt, emphasized his national and international activity: the greatest authority of West German Social Democrats, the leader of the Socialist International and the North-South Commission, showed in the context of concern for the proper development of the disarmament process after the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Pomianowski, 1985), (Jaranowski, 1981), (Brandt, 1977: 2).

More attention was paid to Brandt also in 1981 in connection with his trip to Moscow, which he undertook to discuss matters of a broader international dimension, about the possibilities and conditions for resuming dialogue between the two superpowers at a time when, according to commentators' concerns, the arms race might gain new impetus (Jaranowski, 1981). His stay in the USSR was read as a good sign that "things are starting to return to the right proportions and order, also in the context of Poland." A special place in Polish journalism was occupied by the 15th anniversary of the signing of the treaty. The years 1984-1985 were a period of intensification of anti-German propaganda. Germany was perceived as the main pillar of aggressive American policy (Koszel, 2002), (Patecka-Frauenfelder, 2010). In this context, Willy Brandt was presented as the only person who could sign the treaty in 1970, and his arrival in Warsaw was to be a confirmation that "he was also faithful to the signed treaty and does not hesitate to demonstrate it" (Pomianowski, 1985). The "sincere and friendly" nature of long talks with Polish politicians was emphasized, including a personal conversation with General Wojciech Jaruzelski (Nowakowski, 1985b: 2).

In 1985, the subject of Brandt's gesture (during his first visit in Poland fell to his knees at the memorial of Warsaw Ghetto Uprising) was brought up again, which, according to the journalist, together with the historic "speech at the" Wall of Death "in KL Auschwitz" of Helmut Schmidt was an important step towards overcoming the past (Podkowiński, 1985: 13). It was emphasized in the Polish press that Brandt's visit was not only an opportunity for memories, but also for sensible analyzes in the spirit of developing the leading ideas of the system, for its correct and positive interpretation (Nowakowski, 1985a: 2). The important issues on which the mutual cooperation of European countries was to develop were environmental protection and cultural cooperation (PAP, 1985a: 4). The issue of disarmament was to play an important role in mutual contacts. "Trybuna Ludu" pointed to Brandt's book on disarming "Organized madness". World hunger and the arms race" (PAP, 1985b: 7), emphasizing its unequivocal attitude to arms. The need for disarmament was repeated once again in a joint statement by the PZPR-SPD. Expressing concern, in particular, for Central Europe

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(the zone with the largest concentration of armed forces facing against each other in the world), proposals were formulated against the dynamics of armaments and the need to take political and military bottlenecks to reduce armed forces and armaments and further strengthen confidence in Europe was emphasized (Wspólne, 1988: 2). Reference was made to the Polish plan to create a nuclear-free zone (Rapacki Plan) and the agreement concluded in December 1970 between Germany and Poland and other countries of the socialist community. It was concluded that only on this basis could the Final Act of Helsinki and East-West normalization take place. It was emphasized that without the SPD's contribution to the process of normalization of relations with the GDR, there could be no further development of peaceful relations in Europe (Podkowiński, 1988: 2).

The image of the West German politician was dominated and largely subordinated to one topic: the preparation, signing and ratification of the normalizing treaty between the Polish People's Republic and Germany in December 1970. Most of the material selected for analysis consists of extensive descriptions of the politician's image published in post-1970 journalistic works. The press research conducted on Brandt's image and the German and Eastern policy of his government, based only on the current press material, indicate a greater distance from the chancellor himself and his actions. As researchers agree, the commentators of the events were much more cautious in expressing their judgments about Brandt and his policies (Bingen, 2001), (Kisztełińska-Węgrzyńska, 2009). Polish journalism recognized the signing and ratification of standardization agreements, especially the Warsaw ones, as a turning point in mutual relations. She advertised the regulation of border issues as a success of the entire socialist camp and a confirmation of the rightness of the alliance with the USSR and the GDR. She emphasized that on the part of Germany, the guarantee of its durability was the social democratic camp, in particular Brandt. The demonstration of outstanding relations with Willy Brandt, who until 1987 served as the chairman of the German SPD and was the chairman of the Socialist International, was a method of playing propaganda against the opposition in Poland, which Brandt not only wanted to support, but he demonstratively supported the communist regime. Brandt faced a lot of criticism for his lenient stance on the imposition of martial law in Poland and his refusal to meet Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa during his visit to Poland in 1985 (Pleskot, 2013). Polish propaganda used the positive contribution made by the SPD-FDP coalition to the reconciliation with Poland and the esteem generated around Brandt in Poland to demonstrate support for its policy by recognized politicians in the West.

Conclusions

Among the most frequently presented pictures of Western politicians in the Polish public sphere, five of the most important ones are that of a socialist, an anti-communist, a partner, a statesman and an architect. Although these images perpetuated the realities of the Western world, their main task was to strengthen the successes and achievements of Poland compared to the other countries in the region. The presented contents, the selected quotes and the described contexts of the cited events were to serve the basic political goal of legitimation of power. The initially cautious descriptions of political experiences and activities in the sphere of foreign policy have been transformed over the years into the most exposed asset: socialist views, in line with the program implemented by the Polish authorities. Anti-communist statements were emphasised mainly in the initial period, while the development of bilateral relations in the 1970s brought a lasting image of a politician as a partner and statesman.

The materials prepared by foreign correspondents and the domestic reports from PAP had an even wider and more important context, strengthening the message of the establishment. They were comments on contents that could not really be commented on in the aforementioned way. By observing the development of the narrative on Western politicians foreign policy in the Polish discourse, we can distinguish several popular, exposed political contexts that enjoy greater interest. Among them were Middle Eastern issues and Austria's tense relations with Israel and Central and Eastern Europe and economic cooperation with the West, including the fight during the period of the energy crisis.

Austria as a topic present in the Polish public discourse has two main themes: the past and culture. Both the authors of the texts selected in this study and contemporary researchers on Austria refer to common experiences, relations, myths, achievements and inherited and ruling economic relations. Culture systematically strengthened by Vienna has found a group of active recipients in Poland for centuries. Today, culture is supposed to be a brand of a young, active republic, on the one hand referring to what is important and worth following in the German-speaking community and on the other hand setting its own paths, values and goals. For Bruno Kreisky, these two topics were extremely important in his cooperation with the Central European countries. Austria's common past with such countries was a basis of the further development of the cooperation, but it was not the sole basis. The past dictated the need to shape a new national identity for both Austria and its neighbours. Culture, the second component of mutual contacts, helped define Austria's identity vis-à-vis those of the other countries in the region, and was a visible indicator of the self-awareness of communist countries. Chancellor Kreisky paid special attention to creating the perfect conditions for presenting the cultural achievements of the Eastern countries.

In the first place, materials with more substantive contents were selected, adopting a certain scheme of restrictions concerning, inter alia, comments or the number of people to whom the materials were distributed. The contents distributed by employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not get to the press. Correspondents and journalists could only count on the results of their own research if they managed to go to Austria, or could base their accounts on PAP reports. In the case of the formation of these two types of messages, the purposefulness of their preparation and promotion was different. Diplomats collected factual materials for the development of bilateral relations, and journalists distributed information to a wider audience to keep them abreast with what was going on or to develop their own career. It is worth mentioning once again Khrushchev's report from 1956 in which the Soviet leader mentions cooperation with neutral states (including Austria), and in 1956 extended the possibility of cooperation with other socialist movements, including the Social Democracy. It is also a testimony that the framework of politics (including political journalism) was reserved for the USSR.

With regard to the conditions in which the images of Western politicians were created, several groups of messages on them can be distinguished, concerning the author of the text, the substantive quality of the statements, the period in which they were created, the impact of the bilateral relations to date or the influence of a certain tradition of evaluation on the final result. In the case of the authors of the texts, apart from the aforementioned purposefulness, style should also be considered. The information provided was to be used mainly by high-ranking state officials as a substantive base when establishing guidelines for the operation of individual departments. In their

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memoirs, Polish diplomats repeatedly complained about the lack of freedom in interpreting the actions of Western countries. Meanwhile, journalists managed to add their own comments. Marian Podkowiński was definitely the most active in this respect. In connection with the above, the quality of the comments written in Poland was as poor in the diplomatic circles as in the journalistic circles. The most interesting statements concerned those reports that were based on foreign sources or that were reprints from the Western press. These were interviews with a politician, analyses prepared before the election day or quotes from memories.

The political situation in Poland was decisive for the emerging message: on the one hand, strict censorship until the 1970s, and on the other, the positions held by Brandt and Kreisky. As ministers, there was much less interest in them. On the other hand, however, the freedom of expression that emerged after 1989 did not result in a multiplication of reports on his already historic activity. Not without significance for the evolution of Kreisky's image was his favourable attitude towards Poland. He openly supported the Poles and was positive about the reform attempts; although he did not spare his criticism of the authorities especially after 1981, he was constantly regarded as a reliable partner, to the extent that his statements on Polish issues were treated as a 'model' and were posted in other establishments.

Brandt's and Kreisky's diplomacy texts were influential to varying degrees. Over the decades, the analysed materials had shaped Poland's perceptions of Austria as a country with which Poland maintained bilateral relations. Their rank was given mainly by the publicity that they achieved that had political significance. The intention of the dissemination of knowledge about Kreisky was of key importance to this study. Certain images of Western politician were promoted to strengthen the public-sphere topics that were important from the viewpoint of the Polish authorities. It can be assumed that the writings about former socialists brought the realities of life in a neutral and democratic state and the activity of the socialists therein closer to the public, stigmatised anti-communist attitudes among Western European politicians and emphasised the success of gaining a strong, democratic Western partner looking for trade contacts in the East. The boundaries of the principles of political and economic cooperation between states with different systems were also defined, the activities for disarmament were referred to and the threads related to the common tradition and culture dating back to the beginnings of modern history were emphasised. Polish decision makers have repeatedly used the images and statements of these politicians to legitimise unpopular decisions, such as the reforms preceding the imposition of martial law in the country.

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