Revista de Științe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques • No. 64 • 2019: 76 - 86



ORIGINAL PAPER

Russia as a Great Power and the Quest for International Recognition

Loretta C. Salajan[1)]

Abstract
The article analyzes the quest for international validation of Russia's great power self-image, by drawing from the insightful literatures on state identity recognition and ontological security. After mentioning the main Russian foreign policy schools and their convergence on Russia as a great power in global affairs, the discussion unfolds why this ongoing journey has been particularly problematic. It unpacks the elusive notion of "great power", which goes beyond achieving a set of somewhat objective conditions. A state's great power status heavily relies on the identity verification of salient external audiences or already established great powers. Faced with nonrecognition, elite discourses under the Putin administration have gradually securitized state identity. Russia's great power self-image has been recently redefined to challenge the absence of international recognition, indicating a high level of identity anxiety or ontological insecurity, with troubling effects on the state's foreign policy conduct.

Keywords: *recognition; great powers; Russia; identity; anxiety; security.*

[1)] Lecturer, PhD, University of Oradea, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Sciences, International Relations and European Studies specialization, Email: l.c.salajan@gmail.com.

Russia's foreign and security affairs have inevitably attracted a lot of attention from different academic fields over the years. This article represents a contribution to the International Relations (IR) scholarships on state identity recognition and ontological security, building on the extensive work of Neumann regarding Russia (1996, 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2015). Neumann has offered a historical perspective about Russia's standing as a great power, arguing that its claim to the status was overall unsuccessful throughout nearly five centuries. The main reason for the identity failure is that Russia has refused to adhere to the hegemonic neoliberal model of government, hence its rejection by other established great powers in the West (Neumann, 2008b).

Here the analysis picks up an insufficiently explored argumentative strand and tries to show why Russia's struggle for the international recognition of its great power self-image is particularly difficult in the post-Westphalian international system, perhaps even ill fated from the very start. To achieve this objective, the discussion begins with a section about international recognition and ontological (in)security, which lays the foundation to better understand Russia's identity quest and the response mechanisms used to mitigate the lack of external validation.

The second section focuses on the empirical dimension, introducing the three Russian foreign policy schools whose contrasting opinions have only converged on the idea of Russia as a great power in global affairs. Then it unpacks the notion of "great power" and explains the key role of salient others in validating such a status, with concrete references to the Russian example. Confronted with nonrecognition, domestic elite discourses under the Putin administration have gradually securitized state identity and rearticulated Russia's great power self-image to defy the absence of verification from other established great powers.

International Recognition and Ontological (In)Security

A long-held viewpoint in IR and foreign policy analysis talks about states pursuing their rational and material interests in an anarchic global environment. Without denying the continued relevance and utility of realist and liberal explanations, our understanding of state security practices and foreign policy has evolved and it incorporates now the fundamental role of identity. State anxieties or insecurities could come from possible physical threats and from "the prospective transformations and developments that call into question a state or a group's identity" (Innes and Steele, 2014: 16), which creates the distinction between physical and ontological security.

The notion of ontological security has psychological and sociological origins, which have impacted its use in IR literatures. An issue to note when applying insights from psychology to international relations is the ongoing debate in IR theory about whether or not to conceptualize states as subjects or people (Oprisko and Kaliher, 2014). Eloquent justifications have already been given elsewhere for the argument that states need and seek ontological security (Mitzen, 2006: 351-353), so this assumption is treated as unproblematic here.

Emotional factors underlying state responses in international politics are not actually uncommon. One interesting aspect to ponder is that IR theories like neorealism and neoliberalism feature two central emotions - fear and hate - as the "engines" that drive state behaviour (Crawford, 2000: 120-122). The "cold and calculating" or purely rational and materialistic state reflects a construct or a way of interpreting the world, whereas emphasizing only fear and hate "says more about the agenda of mainstream IR

than it does about the 'irrationality' of emotion as a social reality of world politics" (Steele, 2008: 16).

The growing scholarship on ontological security displays a variety of different and even contradictory positions. But the shared theme or core remains focused on "attempting to articulate the relationship between identity and security", on "what goes into the stories or narratives we tell (...) about ourselves and our relations to others", on investigating the "cognitive and affective reasons why individuals, groups and even states experience insecurity and existential anxiety and to explore the emotional responses to these feelings" (Kinnvall, Mitzen, 2017: 5). The conceptual link between identity and (in)security derives from the process of external recognition.

In the IR literature, recognition has been defined as "a social act that ascribes to a state some positive status, whereby its identity is acknowledged and reinforced as meaningful by a significant Other, and thus the state is constituted as a subject with legitimate social standing" (Murray, 2011: 134). The validity of a state self-image can be deduced from the practice of international politics: if "there is a rough equivalence between our asserted self-image and how we are treated, meaning that if others treat us according to what we consider ourselves to be, our self-image is recognized" (Lindemann, 2010: 9). Being part of a group entails "visible signs" to help with reciprocal identification (Ringmar, 1996: 79).

In an anarchic international environment, it is imperative for states to gain recognition of their self-images and identities for a number of reasons (Murray, 2008). Nonrecognition leads to anxiety and anguish as it threatens an actor's self-esteem and in extreme cases it can represent a challenge to the symbolic existence of the collective (Lindemann, 2010: 24). Usually though, the absence of recognition takes the form of positive self-images not being confirmed by salient others, leaving the state with the dilemma to choose an appropriate response.

States have three possible courses of action, if confronted with the denial of international recognition - a) give up and find "an alternative self-description", without any guarantees that a second attempt at gaining verification will be successful; b) "accept the verdict of the audience" and keep the domestic narratives, while "embarking on a program of self-reformation" to incorporate the missing traits necessary for recognition; c) maintain the self-images and associated meanings and try to persuade others of their legitimacy (Ringmar, 2011: 8).

In the case of Russia, the great power self-image has been incredibly persistent in elite discourses across the political spectrum and different post-Soviet administrations, even if it has come at high costs for domestic society. It is actually the one state self-image that garners agreement from all the schools of Russian foreign policy. Yet Russia's obsessive pursuit of great power status has not been met with the craved international recognition throughout most of its historical trajectory. Considering how deeply ingrained the great power self-image is in Russian consciousness, giving it up would be inconceivable.

At times, the Russian state has embarked on self-reformation to hopefully acquire the absent traits necessary for identity verification, but the outcomes did not lead to success. The only option left is to defy the established great powers and attempt to demonstrate Russia's global status by any means possible, including the breaking of international law. There is a tragic note to Russia's struggle for the international recognition of its great power self-image, which has been ill fated from the beginning.

Understanding Russia's Self-Image as a Great Power

Despite the state's top-down system, the views of Russian foreign policy elites are not homogenous and feature different or even contradictory articulations. These images of the state and the outside world have been circulated with "a remarkable degree of historical continuity" by three distinct and enduring schools of Russian foreign policy - westernist, statist and civilizationist (Tsygankov, 2016: 4).

The westernist school has promoted Russian similarities and identification with the West in its different historical representations. Liberal westernizers were drawn to the ideal of constitutional freedoms as exemplified by western states. In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated the idea of a "common European house", which suggested Russian-European integration based on shared principles (Neumann, 1996: 166). During 2009-2012, Dmitry Medvedev advocated better security cooperation with western states and greater economic and political openness for Russia.

The second school of Russian foreign policy - statism - focuses on "the state's ability to govern and preserve the social and political order" or "the strong state", which prioritizes stability and sovereignty over freedom and democracy (Tsygankov, 2016: 6-7). Statists have been traditionally concerned with the external threats to Russian security. There is the famous example of Josef Stalin framing the need for rapid domestic industrialization as a response to threats from more advanced states. After the Soviet collapse, liberal statists have stressed that Russia must be a great power able to counteract threats anywhere in the world. Vladimir Putin has implemented the strong state vision by tightening control over Russian business, legislature, political party system and electronic media, while fostering bilateral relations in the near abroad and security partnerships with western states to deter terrorism (Tsygankov, 2016: 7-8).

The third school of Russian foreign policy - civilizationism - has insisted on the distinctiveness of Russian civilization, seeking to challenge the western system of values and to propagate Russian influence in areas outside the West. There are various and sometimes opposing strands grouped under the civilizationist umbrella, which include firm commitment to orthodox christianity, Russia as a synthesis of religions, pan-slavism and eurasianism. The eurasianists in the post-Soviet context have treated Russia as a "constantly expanding land-based empire in a struggle for power against sea-based Atlanticism" and notably against the United States (Tsygankov, 2016: 8). Overall, civilizationists remain intrinsically linked to the state image of the "Russian empire" and the more aggressive movements have supported "a widespread external expansion as the best means of ensuring Russia's security" (Tsygankov, 2016: 8).

Thus, Russia's international trajectory has exhibited a series of recurring or redefined themes inherent in the state's foreign policy: "No state can recreate its foreign policy from scratch simply because of particular domestic political changes, even if such change is profound. Foreign policy objectively reflects the characteristics of how a country – its culture, economy, geopolitical situation - have historically developed, and therefore is a complex alloy, comprising elements of both continuity and renewal, which defies expression in an exact formula. It is common that what appears to be a fundamentally new direction for foreign policy actually turns out to be yet another variation of a traditional policy repackaged in a form more in line with the spirit of the times" (Ivanov, 2002: 18).

The one aspect all foreign policy schools converge on is Russia as a great power in world politics, which has been consistently articulated by elites. Among the Russian foreign affairs ministers, Andrei Kozyrev has seen his state as "doomed to be a great

power" (cited in Thorun, 2009: 34), while Yevgeny Primakov confidently declared in 1996 - "Russia will always be a great power. This is not a question of nostalgia, it's simply a sober-minded approach. At present this 'greatness' is based mainly on our strategic potential, which is comparable only to America's. But that's not our country's only trump card. Take, for example, our territory, our scientific potential, the educational level of our people, and the prominent place Russia has always occupied in cultural terms" (cited in Thorun, 2009: 34-35). Igor Ivanov (2002: 13-14) also remarked that "[o]ne legacy bequeathed to us by Soviet foreign policy was a 'superpower mentality', which induced post-Soviet Russia to participate in any and all more or less significant international developments, often incurring a greater domestic cost than the country could bear".

Amidst the harsh socio-economic and political difficulties that characterized the aftermath of Soviet disintegration, Russia's great power status was questionable at best. And yet to ordinary people, as well as to their leaders, it was unthinkable that Russia could be anything less than a great power (Light, 1996: 35). Consensus emerged across the political spectrum on Russia's responsibility to play "a leading global role" in the post-Cold War environment (Lo, 2002: 20). The same certainty was expressed by Putin to an external audience in 2000, when asked about the West's concern regarding the "renewed Russian claims to the status of a great power"; Putin specified that "Russia is not claiming a great power status. It is a great power by virtue of its huge potential, its history and culture" (cited in Smith, 2012: 42). Medvedev echoed the depiction of Russia as a great power throughout his presidency, frequently using it both in the domestic and international arenas (Smith, 2012: 42).

The persistent theme and state image of Russia as a great power in elite discourses is symptomatic of much deeper identity anxieties. It reflects the fear of irrevocably falling behind other more advanced states and of not being up to par with the unwritten standards of great powers in international relations. Historically, Russia's great power self-image has acted as "a prison of its own making" since it constrains internal and foreign policy choices (Neumann, 2015: 5). The Russian state struggles to be an alternative to a dynamic West and implicitly refuses to learn from western experience for a simple reason; "a learner is not a great power – a great power is a power from which others learn" (Neumann, 2015: 5). It is also quite startling to realize that Russia's identity quest for international recognition may have been ill fated from the beginning, as the notion of "great power" is vague and elusive.

This begs the obvious question - what makes any state a great power? Some have provided a deceptively simple answer - "despite the difficulties, one finds general agreement about who the great powers of a period are, with occasional doubt about the marginal cases (...) The question is an empirical one, and common sense can answer it" (Waltz, 1979: 131). Others have been more explicit in their definitions. For instance, Wight (1978: 26) has compiled a list of "basic components" for great power status: "size of population, strategic position and geographical extent, and economic resources and industrial production", which need to combine with "less tangible elements like administrative and financial efficiency, education and technological skill, and above all moral cohesion". It is clear that material capabilities like military strength and economic wealth are an integral part of physical security for great powers and ordinary states in the international realm.

But a contemporary great power relies on the interplay between hard and soft power to advance its foreign and security policies. The two facets of power have been

differentiated by Nye (1990: 178) - "[c]ommand power - the ability to change what others do - can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power - the ability to shape what others want - can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and ideology or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes actors fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic". These somewhat objective criteria for a great power have been openly discussed in IR literature and guide more or less explicitly the prevalent understanding of how global politics works.

At first glance, Russia fits the bill with a "colossal geographic expanse, rapid economic growth, a vast nuclear arsenal, a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (...) plus vast quantities of energy resources and vital raw materials, wide-reaching political influence, and a dynamic leader" (Rumer and Wallander, 2003: 57). Still, great power status is not something that can be attained in a purely objective way. Levy (1981: 585) has suggested this through the "operational indicators of great power status": "possession of high level power capabilities; participation in international congresses and conferences; de facto identification as a Great Power by an international conference or organization; admission to a formal or informal organization of powers (...); participation in Great Power guarantees, territorial compensations, or participations; and generally treatment as a relative equal by other Great Powers". Most of the above indicators configure the intersubjective dimension of great power identity. It is not sufficient for a state to meet the objective conditions required by great power status. Even more significant is the role of external verification by meaningful others (fellow great powers).

Russia's search for the recognition of its great power identity has been analyzed in a historical perspective and declared unsuccessful throughout almost five centuries (Neumann, 2008a, 2008b). The lack of recognition has derived from two basic assumptions - "if an identity claim is successful, it forms part of the horizon of the political debate rather than its substance" and that "[r]ecognition of Russia as a great power can only be given by great powers that are established as such" (Neumann, 2008b: 129). The main reason behind the identity failure would be that, "as long as Russia's rationality of government deviates from present-day hegemonic neo-liberal models by favouring direct state rule rather than indirect governance, the West will not recognize Russia as a fully fledged great power" (Neumann, 2008b: 128). The argument certainly has merit, yet the historical and current absence of recognition between Russia and the West in terms of great power identity has more layers to it than the contrasting type of governance.

Why has Russia's quest for international validation as a great power been so problematic in the post-Westphalian context, even ill fated from the very start? The answer goes back to the modern origins of the international system and the stigma that has discursively operated among states. Stigma is "as much the internalization of a particular normative standard that defines one's own attributes as discreditable, as it is a label of difference imposed from outside" (Zarakol, 2011: 4). Turkey, Japan and Russia were important actors that existed prior to the seventeenth century, but were not members of the initial Westphalian arrangement. When the leaders of each state later decided to join the system emerging from Europe, "by accepting its international standards and borrowing a number of the domestic institutions of its major players", it was a costly delay (Zarakol, 2011: 29).

The western states had already turned into the "gatekeepers" of the international system, which created the "stigma of an insider-outsider status" for Turkey, Japan and

Russia (Zarakol, 2011: 30). An "insecure relationship with the West" contributed towards the modern sense of self for the three entities and has remained ingrained in state identities, which sheds light on their respective foreign relations - from times of enmity to periods of amicable cooperation with the West (Zarakol, 2011: 30).

As a latecomer to the Westphalian arrangement, Russia's narratives about state identity persistently advocated its deserved place among great powers. The goal has always been to foster "a sense of biographical continuity and wholeness that is supported and recognised in and through relations with others" (Kinnvall and Mitzen, 2017: 4). The internal narratives encountered sceptical external audiences that were reluctant to acknowledge the Russian self-proclaimed great power status and the inherent western bias did not help matters at all.

Interestingly, the Soviet Union era and its superpower status in the Cold War environment did not ensure external validation, since Russia's self-images were questioned and unrecognized within the bipolar international system (Ringmar, 2002). But the quest for international recognition has had much more obstacles to surpass in the aftermath of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union has represented an unprecedented crisis with far reaching consequences in terms of identity verification. The Russian self-image of great power has again been subject to intense international debates and often found lacking, inevitably leading to state identity anxieties. Collective actors become ontologically insecure particularly when "critical situations rupture their routines thus bringing fundamental questions to the level of discursive consciousness" (Ejdus, 2018: 884).

After 1991, Russia's "standing as a great power" has relied on armed forces, nuclear arsenal and the influence exerted in the near abroad (Neumann, 2015: 12). It is an unstable foundation if one takes into account the constant need for technological innovation, quality of personnel and high economic resources. Nuclear weapons are "not a fine-grained foreign policy instrument, but more of a marker of status and an insurance against attack", which leaves the near abroad as "all-important for the upkeep of the Russian claim to greatness" (Neumann, 2015: 12).

Russia has always been sensitive when it comes to the near abroad or former Soviet sphere of interest, expecting to be treated as befitting a contemporary great power in international negotiations. This equal treatment and implicit recognition of Russian state identity includes not losing Georgia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova to the western orbit. It constitutes a simplistic way of looking at things, in line with the "imperial syndrome" prevalent in Russian society (Pain, 2016; Trenin, 2011).

Confronted with the persistent nonrecognition of Russia as a great power, elite discourses under the Putin administration have gradually securitized state identity and stressed the idea of Russian uniqueness or exceptionalism. Here securitization means that "something typically becomes a question of security when it is lifted out of the general political agenda and made into a question of life and death" (Neumann, 2005: 18). The discursive shift has been apparent since 2013, when Putin asserted that "finding and strengthening national identity really is fundamental for Russia" (cited in Zevelev, 2016: 8). The securitization of Russian state identity is not an unusual development, if one considers that states secure their selves through "the discursive articulation of a(n) (auto)biographical identity narrative", which "provides meaning for their past and current actions" (Innes and Steele, 2014: 17).

Russian uniqueness has been constructed as deriving from values, history and collective memory: "what makes us unique, our own character and traditions (...) the

historic continuity and the links between the different generations (...) for Russians this is a question of being and remaining Russian" (Putin cited in Zevelev, 2016: 9). State identity and Russian exceptionalism are also reflected in the interpretation of great power called "Derzhavnost" - literally "great powerness", which attempts to simultaneously connect Russia to a universal system of meanings and illustrate the uniqueness located at the core of Russian self-understandings.

Therefore, "Derzhavnost (...) has a meaning all its own, one missing from the English language, simply because the phenomenon is missing. Only the Russians in moments of distress revert to an affection of great-power standing – that is, to asserting their natural right to the role and influence of great power whether they have the wherewithal or not" (Legvold, 2006: 114). The historical articulation of Russia as a Derzhava has been "loosely translated as an entity that can influence the international power equilibrium" (Tsygankov, 2012: 184).

Presently, Russian state identity emerges as a blend of ideas from the statist and civilizationist schools of foreign policy. Sovereignty features prominently in the political rhetoric, which is not surprising because "Russians have developed a psychological complex of insecurity and a readiness to sacrifice everything for independence and sovereignty" (Tsygankov, 2016: 6). Putin's discourse has escalated in intensity and linked sovereignty with state identity - "The desire for independence and sovereignty in spiritual, ideological and foreign policy spheres is an integral part of our national characters"; being even more emphatic in 2014 - "Either we remain a sovereign nation, or we dissolve without a trace and lose our identity" (cited in Zevelev, 2016: 9).

The civilizationist turn has embraced "Russian messianism" (Macfarlane, 1993: 7), promoting a redefined great power self-image. For example, in a 2014 presidential address to the Federal Assembly, Putin declared: "We will protect the diversity of the world. This is our conceptual outlook, and it follows from our own historical destiny and Russia's role in global politics (...) Russia itself has evolved on the basis of diversity, harmony and balance, and brings such a balance to the international stage" (cited in Zevelev, 2016: 10).

Russia's state self-image as a great power has been rearticulated to defy the absence of international recognition. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has been explicit about it by circulating a definition of great power identity from Russian philosophy - "Greatpowerness is not determined by the size of the territory or the number of inhabitants but by the ability of people and their government to assume the burden of great international tasks and deal with these tasks creatively. A great power is the one which, while asserting its existence and interest (…), introduces a creative and accommodating legal idea to the entire community of nations, the entire 'concert' of peoples and states" (Ivan Ilyin cited in Lavrov, 2016).

The missionary element of great power self-image and its challenge to nonrecognition indicate that Russia's identity anxieties have reached a high point, with unpredictable implications for global politics. Russia has already found and implemented "creative" ways to fuel frozen conflicts in its near abroad, going as far as the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Future prospects are even more worrying because an unrecognized great power could inflict a lot of damage to legitimize its self-proclaimed narratives.

Conclusions

This article has aimed to contribute towards the IR literatures on international recognition and ontological security, by analyzing an insufficiently explored component of Russia's difficult journey to validate its great power self-image. Neumann's ample work on Russia underlines that the identity verification process was historically unsuccessful during nearly half a millennium. That is a long time to accumulate frustrations and identity anxieties due to lack of external validation. Neumann has also opined that Russia will continue to face rejection as a great power, as long as it refuses to adopt the neoliberal model of government, which is dominant in the West.

Yet why has Russia's identity quest for international recognition been particularly problematic, even in historical periods when the West was not keen on liberal and indirect forms of government? There is an argumentative gap here that deserves further explanation, as the article has gradually shown. The bottom line remains that Russia's struggle for validating its great power status in the post-Westphalian context was ill fated from the beginning.

A good starting point to understand the complex Russian political dynamic is that, although the main foreign policy schools radically disagree on many things, they have always converged on the idea of Russia being a great power in international affairs. After unpacking the vague notion of "great power", one realizes that a state cannot become a great power by fulfilling a set of somewhat objective criteria like substantial military strength, economic wealth or soft power instruments. The identity process requires the key role of international recognition from meaningful others – already established great powers.

The great power self-image is a deeply ingrained articulation in Russian consciousness, which has limited the available responses to mitigate the absence of international recognition. Renouncing the great power self-representation was out of the question and attempts to reformulate it by engaging with the West were not successful either. The core issue lies in the Westphalian origins of the international system and the fact that Russia was not a member of the initial arrangement. Consequently, Russia has been treated as an outsider by the West, struggling to surpass a certain stigma that discursively operates among states.

Unfortunately, the persistent nonrecognition of Russia's great power self-image has led to identity anxieties and ontological insecurity. The latter have manifested in the progressive securitization of state identity under the Putin administration. If an actor cannot give up or rearticulate a self-image to gain external acceptance, the only solution left is to reinforce the identity narratives in the global arena by any means deemed appropriate or useful, including the breaking of international law. The recent emphasis on Russian exceptionalism and the redefinition of Russia as a great power with a missionary vocation, which explicitly challenge the lack of international recognition, are troubling developments, whose long term implications need further investigation.

References:

Crawford, N. (2000). The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships. *International Security*, 24(4), 116–156.

Ejdus, F. (2018). 'Critical Situations, Fundamental Questions and Ontological Insecurity in World Politics', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 21(4), 883-908.

Innes, A. and Steele, B. (2014). Memory, Trauma and Ontological Security. In Resende, E. and Budryte, D. (editors), *Memory and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates*, London: Routledge.

Ivanov, I. (2002). *The New Russian Diplomacy*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Ivanov, I. (2005). Russian Foreign Policy on the Eve of the 21st Century: Problems of Formation, Development and Continuity. In Melville, A. an Shakleina, T. (eds.), *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities,* Budapest: Central European University Press.

Kinnval, C., Mitzen, J. (2017). An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 52(1), 3-11.

Lavrov, S. (2016). Russia's Foreign Policy in a Historical Perspective: Musings at a New Stage of International Development. *Russia in Global Affairs.* Retrieved from http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russias-Foreign-Policy-in-a-Historical-Perspective-18067 (February 2019).

Legvold, R. (2006). Russian Foreign Policy during Periods of Great State Transformation. In Legvold, R. (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Levy, J. (1981). Alliance Formation and War Behavior – An Analysis of the Great Powers 1495-1975. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(4), 581-613.

Light, M. (1996). Foreign Policy Thinking. In Malcolm, N., Pravda, A., Allison, R. and Light, M. (eds.), *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, Oxford: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Lindemann, T. (2010). *Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition*, Essex: European Consortium for Political Research Press.

Lo, B. (2002). *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

MacFarlane, N. (1993). Russia, the West and European Security. *Survival*, 35(3), 3–25.

Mitzen, J. (2006). Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma. *European Journal of International Relations*, 12(3), 341-370.

Murray, M. (2008). *The Struggle for Recognition in International Politics: Security, Identity, and the Quest for Power*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Murray, M. (2011). Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco. In Lindemann, T. and Ringmar, E. (eds.), *The International Politics of Recognition*, London: Paradigm.

Neumann, I. (1996). *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations*, London: Routledge.

Neumann, I. (2005). Russia as a Great Power. In Hedenskog, J., Konnander, V., Nygren, B., Oldberg, I. and Pursiainen, C. (eds.), *Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin*, London: Routledge.

Neumann, I. (2008a). Russia's Standing as a Great Power, 1492–1815. In Hopf, T. (ed.), *Russia's European Choice*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Neumann, I. (2008b). Russia as a Great Power, 1815-2007. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 11, 128-151.

Neumann, I. (2015). I Remember when Russia Was a Great Power. *Journal of Regional Security*, 10(1), 5-16.

Nye, J. Jr. (1990). The Changing Nature of World Power. *Political Science Quarterly*, 105(2), 177-192.

Oprisko, R. and Kaliher, K. (2014). The State as Person? Anthropomorphic Personification vs. Concrete Durational Being. *Journal of International and Global Studies*, 6(1), 30-49.

Pain, E. (2016). The Imperial Syndrome and Its Influence on Russian Nationalism. In Kolstø, P. and Blakkisrud, H. (eds.), *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000-2015*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Ringmar, E. (1996). *Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ringmar, E. (2002). The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia against the West. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(2), 115-136.

Ringmar, E. (2011). The International Politics of Recognition. In Lindemann, T. and Ringmar, E. (eds.), *The International Politics of Recognition.* London: Paradigm.

Rumer, E. and Wallander, C. (2003). Russia: Power in Weakness?. *The Washington Quarterly*, 27(1), 57-73.

Smith, H. (2012). Domestic Influences of Russian Foreign Policy: Status, Interests and Ressentiment. In Freire, M.R. and Kanet, R.E. (eds.), *Russia and Its Near Neighbours*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Steele, B. (2008). *Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State*, London: Routledge.

Thorun, C. (2009). *Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia's Conduct towards the West*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Trenin, D. (2011). *Post-Imperium: a Eurasian Story*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Tsygankov, A. (2012). *Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tsygankov, A. (2016). *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, 4th edition, Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield.

Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*, London: McGraw-Hill.

Wight, M. (1978). *Power Politics*, Leicester: Leicester University Press and The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Zarakol, A. (2011). *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zevelev, I. (2016). *Russian National Identity and Foreign Policy: A Report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program*, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Article Info

Received: May 15 2019
Accepted: December 04 2019