



ORIGINAL PAPER

Władysław Gomułka: One of the most influential of the East European Communist Party leaders

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Abstract

Władysław Gomułka, was a first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party. He born in Białobrzegi, near Krosno in former Austro-Hungarian Kingdom (actual in Poland) on February 6, 1905 and he died in Warsaw on September 1, 1982. From 1956 to 1970 he ruled the communist party of Poland. He was the creator of the concept – the Polish road to socialism. Władysław Gomułka is appreciated to be one of the remarkable men in Polish politics after the second war. Władysław Gomułka has been one of the most important men in Polish politics of the 20th century. In a same time he performed an important act in his quality of the leader of the East European Communist Party. In 1926, Gomułka became a member of the Polish Communist Party (Communistyczna Partia Polski, KPP), so during World War II he played a crucial role in the resistance struggle. By the other hand Gomułka played in post-war Polish politics and the “de-Stalinization” process. Although he will be the artisan of Poland's de-Stalinization process, Gomułka will not give up the Soviet bloc. Gomułka represented a very distinct kind of communism and his slogan the “Polska Droga” (the Polish Road, or Polish Way was understood by the other communist countries in the Eastern bloc that everyone must choose their own path to socialism. An undoubted achievement of Gomułka's politics was the negotiation of a treaty with West Germany, signed in December 1970. The crisis at the end of Gomułka's tenure coincided with great success in foreign policy. The economic difficulties facing Poland in the late 1970s will lead to prices hikes. In these circumstances, in December 1970, violent clashes will take place between law enforcement and workers at the shipyards on the Baltic Sea coast. Several dozen workers will lose their lives, Gomułka being forced to resign.

Keywords: *Gomułka; leader; policies; reforms; persecution.*

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Władysław Gomułka, was a first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party. He born in Białobrzegi, near Krosno in former Austro-Hungarian Kingdom (actual in Poland) on February 6, 1905 and he died in Warsaw on September 1, 1982. From 1956 to 1970 he ruled the communist party of Poland. He was the creator of the concept – the Polish road to socialism. Władysław Gomułkais appreciated to be one of the remarkable men in Polish politics after the second war.

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The crisis at the end of Gomułka's tenure coincided with great success in foreign policy. The economic difficulties facing Poland in the late 1970s will lead to price hikes. In these circumstances, in December 1970, violent clashes will take place between law enforcement and workers at the shipyards on the Baltic Sea coast. Several dozen workers will lose their lives, Gomułka being forced to resign.

In 1926, Gomułka became a member of the Polish Communist Party (Communistyczna Partia Polski, KPP), so during World War II he played a crucial role in the resistance struggle. In 1930s the situation of KPP became critical. In order to divide the communist movement, the spies and Trotsky's followers tried to form "factions" amongst some communist parties, to provoke infighting. The Communist Party of Poland was contaminated by hostile elements. The extremist groups in Poland are not able to get leadership positions in the KPP. KPP disappears from the list of parties affiliated to the Comintern. About 5,000 Polish communists were shot or sent to the Gulag. In those moments survive persons found in Polish prisons or recruited by Service Security of Soviet. In 1941, after Hitler's attack on Russia, Stalin changed his attitude about Poland. Stalin put the problem of reintegration of Polish communist movement in general strategy of Soviet Union. In January 1942 the nucleus of the new party was met in clandestinely. The new party will be called Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza, PPR). After Marcel Nowotko's murder mysterious circumstances and Pawel Finder's arrest by the Gestapo, Władysław Gomułka became the Party's secretary general in November 1943. The personality of Gomułka reflected many of the fundamental characteristics of Polish communism revived. At the base of his political actions were the constant commitment of communist ideals, and the repulsion of Soviet practices. In 1934 Gomułka went to Moscow, where he lived and studied at the International Lenin School for a year. He was witness to the campaign of collectivization in Ukraine. Gomułka decided that such inhuman methods will never be applied in Poland. After his return to Poland he worked as a regional KPP secretary in Silesia. He was arrested in 1936, sentenced to seven years in prison and remained jailed until the beginning of World War II. In 1943, in occupied Warsaw Gomułka established

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a national quasi-parliament (the communist version) named the State National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa, KRN) and was a deputy in that body. In 1942, in the peak of Nazi Germany terror, Gomułka participated in the reformation of a Polish communist party. He organized the party structures in the Subcarpathian region, but soon was brought to the capital to lead the PPR Warsaw division. His appointment to the position of the Party's secretary general coincided with the publication of the full text of the party manifesto under the title "What do we fight for?" (O co walczymy?). Manifesto given equal importance to objectives of national independence and to social revolution. From many points of view Gomułka remained a communist traditional, disciplined and realistic. His stubborn nature was an obstacle for soviet project to manipulation Poland's interests. Gomułka led a group of people convinced that the only guarantee of Poland against Soviet imperialism is a kind of radical polish communism. In 1945 to Yalta Conference the Soviet Union agreed to form a coalition government composed of the Communist Polish Workers' Party, members of the pro-Western Polish government in exile, and members of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK) resistance movement, as well as to allow for free elections to be held. In 1944 it was beginning the liberation of Polish territory. The control's Polish territories were assumed by the Red Army in a short time. In Lublin the Polish communists created A Provisional Government (Rząd Tymczasowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, RTRP) and Gomułka became a deputy prime minister in this Government for a half year on 1945. The Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, PKWN) and a Provisional Government (Rząd Tymczasowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, RTRP) were subordinate the State National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa, KRN). The Red Army transferred the control over Polish territories to the Provisional Government (Rząd Tymczasowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, RTRP).

By the other hand Gomułka played in post-war Polish politics and the "de-Stalinization" process. Although he will be the artisan of Poland's de-Stalinization process, Gomułka will not give up the Soviet bloc. He impose an "own model of economic and political development" (Prazmowska, 2015: 123). Gomułka represented a very distinct kind of communism and his slogan the "Polska Droga" (the Polish Road, or Polish Way), was often understood that the communists of each particularly country should adopt the path to socialism most suited to their context. From 1945 to 1947 he was a deputy prime minister in the Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej). From his position as Minister of the Recovered Territories, Gomułka played an important role in the management of the lands acquired from Germany after the Second World War. Between 1945 and 1948 Gomułka supervised the reconstruction and integration of the new lands in the new borders of Poland.

During this period enjoying a privileged position both in the party and in the government Gomułka overwhelmingly influenced the social changes of leftists in Poland. In 1948 the communists will receive the help of Gomułka and they will win the referendum.

A year later, he played a key role in the 1947 parliamentary elections. After the elections, all remaining legal opposition in Poland was effectively destroyed. However, a rivalry between Polish communist factions (Gomułka was the leader of a home national group vs. Bolesław Bierut of Stalin's group reared during the war in the Soviet Union) led to Gomułka's removal from power in 1948 and imprisonment (from August 1951 to December 1954). He was accused of "right wing-reactionary deviation" and expelled

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from the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) (as the Polish Workers' Party was renamed following a merger with the Polish Socialist Party). In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev remembered that he was not a witness to how Gomulka's fate was decided when the question of him, arrest was raised. Nikita Khrushchev said that for him it was incomprehensible, and he regretted that happened, because he respected Gomulka and he always regarded Gomulka as one of the worthiest leaders of Poland, an influential and useful man (Khrushchev, 2007: 617). Of course, Khrushchev's words have to be appreciated with much discernment. It seems that one of the charges against him was that he supported the Yugoslaves and never expressed sharp criticism of Tito.

Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki in a "Concise History of Poland" noted that: "Despite its totalitarian features, Stalinist rule in Poland never became a clone of its Soviet model and avoided some of the excesses witnessed in other satellite states, such as the purge trials of communist leaders in Czechoslovakia and Hungary between 1949 and 1952. But the post-Stalinist political thaw was a slow process, limited at first to the PZPR. It started with discreet purge in 1953 within the Polish security apparatus" (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006: 294).

The Soviet system after Stalin's death affected the satellite states of East Europe in different ways. Nikita S. Khrushchev, the new soviet leader, followed and attempted to influence the pace and nature of the changes throughout the region with varying degrees of success. By October 1956, the "de-Stalinization" debate in Poland focused on the potential return of Wladyslaw Gomulka to the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR).

The situation in Poland in 1956 was resumed this: "Under Soviet domination since World War II, the industrial, trading, and financial sectors of the economy were socialized, but in agriculture, although large estates were expropriated, only about one-fifth of the arable land has been socialized – less than in any other European Satellite. Nevertheless, pressure to collectivize has dampened incentive in private agriculture and has had a deleterious effect on output" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1999: I).

Gomulka returned to power in October 1956 due by the occurrence the "National Communist" regime in Poland which was a result of circumstances. After the death of Stalin at the 20th Soviet party congress in February 1956 Khrushchev denigrated Stalin, in Yugoslavia Tito was implicated in a new political orientation "separate roads to socialism" and in June 1956 Poland was shaken by the Poznan riots. In these circumstances the struggle between different factions of the party discredited the Stalinist leaders of the Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR). In the process of "de-Stalinization" Polish intellectuals are beginning to seeking new socialist principles and dogmas. Inside change, promoted by Khrushchev's speech in Moscow, on the condemnation of Stalin's cult, becomes the priority requirement of the party's liberals. In these conditions the party's liberal leaders make possible the return of Gomulka into the party leadership. Gomulka was return in the party in his own conditions, "which included the elimination of the Stalinists" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1956: I).

On March 1956 the Stalinist General Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) Bierut died thus opening a strong conflict at the top of the Party for the power. The fight is fought between the Natolin group (small town near Warsaw) and Pulawska (after the name of the street in Warsaw). The first group was composed by the pro-Soviet activists with conservative and orthodox views. They tried to clean the responsibility for the crimes of the Stalinist era

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and to demonstrate "anti-Stalin" through nationalist, anti-Semitic phrases and anti-intellectualist. They are demanding, for tactical reasons, readmission Gomulka's party leadership. They were adherents of moderate reforms, but at the same time they advocate for strengthening state control over society. They are obviously enjoying the support of the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw. The second group was composed of followers of democrat reforms. It was made up of Jews which in the years of the war were in the USSR, former internationalist, benefiting from good ties with the press, but with an imprecise political program. They were looking providential and charismatic caretaker leader to meet aspirations popular. They didn't accept the return of Gomulka. The low salaries and increased production norms in aim to recovery the economy caused the discontent among the workers at the end of 1955. On June 1956, violent worker protests broke out in Poznan. The worker riots were harshly suppressed and dozens of workers were killed. In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev remembered that the tensions were increasing in Poland and that this turbulence had an anti-Soviet tone and the demonstrators were demanding withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland (Khrushchev, 2007: 625). Under these circumstances, the gap between reforming members and the most dogmatic of the Polish Communist Party is getting deeper much, Gomulka's return to power being a necessary condition to ensure the survival of the system itself. "The Poznan riots caused an important change in the attitude of the party leaders toward Gomulka. Prior to the time, in response to popular tensions and pressure within the party, "representatives" of the politburo met with Gomulka to ascertain the conditions under which he might return to public life" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1956: 69-70). Because the talks were conducted by Stalinist leaders the situation was intolerable for Gomulka and he refused the offer.

The reformers in the Party wanted a political rehabilitation of Gomulka and his return to the Party leadership but Gomulka wanted a replacement of some of the Party leaders, including the pro-Soviet Minister of Defense Konstantin Rokossovsky. Konstantin Rokossovsky was de facto soviet Marshal. In these circumstances took place on October 15 a meeting of the reformers which "definitely decided that Gomulka would be chosen first secretary of the party at the forth coming plenum"(Central Intelligence Agency, 1956: 76). The soviet Marshal Rokossovsky went to Moscow in a failed attempt to convince Nikita Khrushchev to use force against the Polish state. In short time a plane landed at Warsaw airport carrying CPSU First secretary Khrushchev, who was accompanied Presidium members Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Marshal Konev and a many array of Soviet officers. Their arrival, "coincided with reports of the movement of Soviet troops from their bases in western Poland toward Warsaw, and the alert of Soviet forces in East Germany and the western USSR" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1956: 77). In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev notes: "I trust Gomulka as a Communist. Things are difficult for him. He can't do everything at once, but if we express confidence in him, return our troops to where they are stationed, and give him time, he will gally be able to cope with the force that are now taking incorrect positions" (Khrushchev, 2007: 630). The discussions between the Soviets and the Polish lasted until the day of the Eighth Polish Plenum on October 20, 1956. During this time, workers and students in Warsaw were in alert. The Soviet leaders understand that their efforts to intimidate the Polish liberal leaders were not possible and in the morning on 20 October they departed. Ochab and Gomulka made it clear that Polish forces would resist if Soviet troops advanced, but reassured the Soviets that the reforms were internal matters and that Poland had no intention of abandoning the communist bloc or its treaties with the Soviet

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Union. The Soviets yielded.

Gomułka was elected general secretary of the PZPR on 20 October 1956. In his speech to the Eighth Polish Plenum on 20 October he charged that the "expand industry on a broad scale" in a short time lead the Polish economy to "insolvent" of country. He accused the former leaders of the party that Poland became dependent by USSR.

Władysław Gomułka's re-entry into the political Polish scene produced in a radically changed atmosphere, with the revival of public interest in politics and in the future of the state. The return of Władysław Gomułka was now demanded by the party's ordinary members and by the pressure groups outside. It is realizing, thus, a coagulation of public opinion in favor of Gomułka. He was conditioning the return in the Party by the "Polish Way" program towards socialism, which he was still proposing from 1948. He was considering in particular the replacement of officers and Soviet advisors from the Polish army, especially a marshal Konstanty Rokossowski (Minister of Defense).

With this occasion he declared that he will return the true Leninist principles in the life of the party and of the state. Gomułka's Poland was generally described as one of the more "liberal" Communist regimes, and Poland was certainly more open than East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania during this period.

At the Eighth Polish Plenum on 20 October Gomułka proclaimed his the attachment to Communist doctrine and "confined his criticisms to the manner in which his predecessors sought to build a road to socialism" (Central Intelligence Agency^{1999: 2}). With this occasion he proposed economic reforms. The economic reforms proposed by Gomułka were watching for the financial domain the tighter control over state funds, the production control and pricing. Not in the last the workers can be represented "in factory management on a limited experimental basis" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1999: 2). In the agriculture he proposed replaced the forced collectivization of private farms with "a long-run program to persuade private farmers to join collectives voluntarily" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1999: 2). The new elected general secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) Władysław Gomułka held a victory speech on October 24. "Over 300,000 people gathered to hear the First Secretary, the largest meeting of its kind in Poland until the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1979" (Gluchowski, 1995: 46). Gomułka was in the apogee of his popularity, so he traied to end to demonstrations and determined the workers to return to work. In his speech said: "united with the working class and the nation (...) the Party will lead Poland along a new way of socialism".

Gomułka triumph didn't nevertheless mean a triumph of the Polish nation against Moscow, because the new leader was an old communist, supporter of the doctrine Marxist-Leninist.

The political crisis of 1956 had the effect of some liberalization of the political Polish regime. Soviet presence has become more discreet, and the power of secret services was diminished. Even the anti-Soviet sentiments in Poland continued Gomułka never asked the Soviet leaders to withdraw the Soviet troops by Poland territory. Gomułka considered that the Soviet troops stationed in Poland it was necessary and useful for the country. Gomułka has said: "Our intelligentsia fears the Germans most of all. They are a threat to Poland, especially if there's a breakdown in our friendly relations with USSR" (Khrushchev, 2007: 631).

Gomułka was initially very popular for his reforms. His seeking a "Polish way to socialism", and it is giving rise to the period known as "Gomułka's thaw". Gomułka devise a new electoral law to allow people to choose not just to vote. Important laws

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were imposed in administrative, civil and criminal fields. The liberalization after 1956 created the premises of a process of reconstruction of civil Polish society. An essential role they had the church which has managed to retain some independence. The most oppressive Stalinist features were eliminated: the rule of terror was curbed, the persecution of the Roman Catholic Church was ended, and the collectivization of agriculture was abandoned. Several objectionable features of the older system were, however preserved. The "de-Stalinization" process started in 1957 by Gomułka meant a new electoral law, as well as the emergence of a new legislative framework in the administrative, civil and criminal field. Although Gomułka's regime is much more humane than its predecessor's regime, soon Gomułka will lose respect for the disappointed Poles who were waiting for the liberalization of the Republic of Poland following the model of the Western democracies.

During the 1960s, however, he became more conservative. Afraid of destabilizing the system, he was not inclined to introduce or permit changes. In the 1960s he supported the persecution of the Catholic Church and intellectuals. The Conflict between the Church and the Government know a new escalate around the celebration of the Polish Millennium of Christianity in 1966. During the celebration, the Communist authorities refused to allow Pope Paul VI to visit Poland.

The 1968 crisis was the result of cumulative failures: agricultural policy failures, low level of living, party bureaucracy, censorship. Following the mishaps of March 1968, the Jewish community of the country will be forced to emigrate massively. In 1968 Gomułka allowed outbursts of "anti-Zionist" political propaganda (Judt, 2005: 434-435). The result was that the majority of the remaining Polish citizens of Jewish origin left the country. At that time he was also responsible for persecuting protesting students. In Poland, the official ideology of the state glorified ethno-national homogeneity, and kindled hatred towards foreigners, particularly Germans and Jews.

Gomułka was one of the key leaders of the Warsaw Pact and supported Poland's consequent participation in intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 (Davies, 2005: 475). Gomułka supported that the Soviet Union had prepared a plan for intervention in Czechoslovakia to prevent German occupation and it was in Poland's interest to take part.

In the late 1970s, Poland faced a series of economic problems caused by poor, numerous social movements, lack of consumer goods, outdated technology, rising inflation, and extremely high external debt. The economic difficulties facing Poland in the late 1970s will lead to price hikes. In these circumstances, in December 1970, violent clashes will take place between law enforcement and workers at the shipyards on the Baltic Sea coast. Several dozen workers will lose their lives, Gomułka being forced to resign.

Third time an undeniable achievement of Gomułka's politics was the negotiation of a treaty with West Germany, signed in December 1970. The crisis at the end of Gomułka's tenure coincided with great success in foreign policy. "When Gomułka finally decided to open up to Bonn in 1969, he entered into a running conflict with the Soviet Union and the GDR over whose interests were to take priority in negotiations with the West Germans. Second, the traditional narrative suggests that the only factor affecting Poland's decision to enter into negotiations with Bonn was Brandt's offer. Available sources, however, suggest that it was not Brandt's offer, but changes within the Warsaw Pact—specifically, the openness of Moscow and East Berlin to negotiations with West Germany—that led Gomułka to break down and respond to Brandt's offer"

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(Selvage, 2003: 67). Gomulka's opening to Bonn was determined by the inner dynamics of the Warsaw Pact. Norman Davies explained that Gomulka knew that the revisionism of Germany perpetuated humiliating dependence of Poland from the Soviet Union. "In Gomulka's eyes the major threat to Poland was posed by Germany and he was a strong proponent of an alliance with the Soviet Union" (Bromke, 1971: 480). On December 7, 1970 was signed a treaty signed between Polish People's Republic and West Germany in Warsaw. The German side recognized the post-World War II borders, - the west border of Poland with Germany by Oder and Neisse Line - formed by the rivers known in Poland as the Odra and Nysa Łużycka. "The establishment of the border along the Oder-Neisse line actually had serious geo - political consequences for Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. Poland's regaining of a Baltic shore running between Krynica Morska/Neukrug and Świnoujście/Swinemünde changed the country's position vis-à-vis Germany, at a stroke reconfiguring the geostrategic system of the southern Baltic basin" (Eberhardt, 2015: 101). Gomulka managed to defuse the grip of direct guardianship of Soviet Union by international and internal fields. This major achievement compensates Gomulka's failures. "The limits of the Polish autonomy were thus also defined by Western policies and attitudes" (Brzezinski, 1961: 366).

"To summarize, the danger of a future unification of Germany, caused by the German Democratic Republic's economic policies, along with the threat of diminished sovereignty for Poland, resulting from Soviet-West German negotiations, led Gomulka to make his opening to Bonn. If the Soviet Union had not been so open to Brandt's overtures, or if the German Democratic Republic had agreed to economic integration with Poland, Gomulka would have likely vetoed or postponed any negotiations with West Germany. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance summit in April 1969 had made clear, however, that the economic future of the Soviet bloc would not be based on economic integration, but on an economic opening to the West. For Gomulka, this meant the "economic reunification" of Germany and the potential collapse of the Soviet bloc. He had to rescue what he could, while he could, for a communist Poland" (Selvage, 2003: 74-75).

"The potential unification of Germany and Moscow's perceived willingness to compromise Poland's security interests compelled Gomulka to obtain an independent West German guarantee for Poland's western border. Gomulka achieved his goal with the Treaty of Warsaw of December 1970. He obtained de facto recognition of the border in a bilateral treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany at a time when the future of the border was threatened—in his opinion—through the policies of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. If the Warsaw treaty was a victory for Brandt, then it was even more so for Gomulka; it was his crowning achievement, attained less than two weeks before his fall from power on December 20, 1970" (Selvage, 2003: 75). On 14 November, 1990 German and Poland signed The German-Polish Border Treaty finalizing the Oder–Neisse line as the Polish-German border. In conclusion, Władysław Gomulka had a pivotal role in building a communist-led resistance in occupied Poland during World War II, he played in post-war Polish politics and the "de-Stalinization" process and an undeniable achievement of he's politics was the negotiation of a treaty with West Germany. These arguments support that Władysław Gomulka was a key player within Polish politics for over two decades and one of the most influential of the East European Communist Party leaders. As a symbol, Gomulka offered something to everyone, explained Zbigniew Brzezinski. "He was a former victim of Stalinism and its recognized opponent.... To the anti-Communists, he was the leader of a movement

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toward independence, to the revisionists, toward a democratic socialism. To the concerned Communists, he was the savior of the crumbling Communist rule” (Brzezinski, 1961: 334).

Gierek replaced Władysław Gomułka as first secretary of the ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) in the Polish People's Republic in 1970.

Władysław Gomułka died on September 2, 1982. The official Polish press agency P.A.P. announced: “He was an outstanding patriot and internationalist”.

Władysław Gomułka will remain one of the most interesting personality of the 20th century Poland. Gomułka's negative image in communist propaganda after his removal in 1970 was gradually modified and some of his constructive contributions were recognized. The early years of Gomułka leadership seem to be the most liberal regime known in Poland. He is committed to introducing a significant number of reforms in Poland in various fields: agriculture, industry. The communist system of Poland led by Gomułka was subject to a regime of liberalization. Only a tenth of the agricultural land was subject to the collectivization process, while foreign trade with capitalist countries in Western Europe was in full swing.

He tried to improve the relationship with the Church and pursued a pragmatic cultural policy. Unfortunately, the last years of Gomułka's leadership were unquestionably the years of his policy failure. He becomes more conservative, fearing that the changes will lead to political destabilization of the system. He is seen as an honest and austere believer in the socialist system, unable to resolve Poland's formidable difficulties and meet mutually contradictory demands grew more rigid and despotic later in his career.

Communist propaganda in the 1970s seriously attacked Władysław Gomułka. He has entered a shadow over a long period of time. After 1990 the subject Gomułka raised the interest of public opinion as well as of specialists in history and political scene. As far as foreign policy, Władysław Gomułka will succeed in creating his own partnership model with the Soviet Union and will secure Poland's international recognition in Western European countries.

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